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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 1 enacted in 1966, provided for public access to government records to enable the general
public to affect the policies of the federal government. 2 Commercial
enterprises, however, were among the most frequent users of the original Act.3 Other potential users, such as news media seeking to disseminate information, scholars and researchers wishing to examine past and
present government policies and performance, and nonprofit groups
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has summarized the purposes
of the Act as follows:
Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act in response to a persistent problem of legislators and citizens, the problem of obtaining adequate information to evaluate federal programs and formulate wise policies. Congress recognized that the public
cannot make intelligent decisions without such information, and that governmental mstitutions become unresponsive to public needs if knowledge of their activities is denied to
the people and their representatives.
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The moving force behind the provisions
for obtaining agency documents was the press; the organized bar pressed for the publication and
indexing provisions. The statute's name apparently originated in a "Freedbm of Information
Committee" of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, established before 1950. See H.
CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
vii (1953). One prescient commentator predicted in 1967 that the main beneficiaries of the Act
would not be the press or the public, but lawyers and their clients. See Davis, The Information
Ac: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 804 (1967).
3. One survey indicated that of the identifiable users, there were three times as many requests from corporations and private law firms as from the news media, public-interest groups,
and researchers. "Others," a catch-all category which included individual citizens, was approximately equal to corporate and private law firm use. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, H. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess. 7-8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 HOUSE REPORT], reprintedin HOUSE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS & SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG,., lST SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT & AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P.L. 93-502) SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, TEXrs, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 14-15 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as
1975 SOURCE BOOK].
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seeking to affect government policy, were all stymied to various degrees
4
by the high costs of obtaining government documents.

In 1974, in response to complaints about the administration of the
Act contained in a study by the Administrative Conference of the

United States5 and in oversight hearings by a congressional committee,6 Congress passed several amendments to make access easier.

Among these amendments was the current section 552(a)(4)(A), which
provides in part:
Documents shall be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge
where the agency determines that waiver or reduction of thefee is in the
public interestbecausefurnishingthe information can be consideredas
primarily benfting the generalpublic .
4. These costs can reach into the tens of thousands of dollars. See, e.g., text accompanying
notes 204-05 infra. A group of public-interest lawyers who had come to Washington in 1969 and
1970 to study the regulatory practices of various agencies were the first to publicize this problem.
They encountered resistance in attempting to use the FOIA in their research and wrote a series of
law review articles critical of agency handling of their FOIA requests. See, e.g., Katz, The Games
BureaucratsPlay: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEX. L. REV. 1261
(1970); Nader, Freedom From Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
1 (1970).

5. The Conference undertook the study in response to the complaints voiced in the articles
cited in note 4supra. The study concluded that the difficulties the public-interest lawyers encountered were representative of problems other requesters encountered. Gianella, 4gency Procedures
Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: 4 Proposalfor Unform Regulations, 23 AD. L.
REv. 217, 221 (1971), reprintedin SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 296, 300 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 SOURCE BOOK]. The study identified six problem areas, including excessive and non-uniform search and copying fees. Id 222-25, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra, at 301-04. Gi-

anella considered the possibility of charging as the fee for some requests the actual costs of
providing the documents, and waiving all fees for other requests. He concluded that such a policy
would be unworkable in practice, however, and recommended that agencies charge uniform page
fees and waive fees according to the identity of the requester. Id 259, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE
BOOK, supra, at 338.
6. The Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations conducted oversight hearings from June 1971 through June
1972. The Committee concluded that "most of the Federal bureaucracy already set in its ways
never got the message" about giving government documents to the public and that there had been
"5 years of foot-dragging by the Federal bureaucracy." 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 7-8,
reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 14-15. The problems the House Committee
identified, including "abuses in fee schedules," id, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3,
at 15, closely paralleled those the Administrative Conference had spotlighted. The Committee
noted that "excessive charges for such services have been an effective bureaucratic tool in denying
information to individual requesters." Id It noted with favor the recommendations of the Administrative Conference study and recommended that federal departments and agencies should,
within their existing authority, establish on a uniform basis "the lowest reasonable search and
reproduction fees" and also "include provisions for waiver of fees in hardship cases or when
waiver would serve the public interest." Id 82, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at

89.
7. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976) (emphasis added). Congress enacted the fee-waiver provi-

sion because it believed agencies were charging high fees to discourage certain types of requesters
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The years since the adoption of the "fee waiver" provision have

seen, if anything, an increase in use of the FOIA predominantly for
business purposes." Requests alleging a benefit to the general public

account for less than two percent of all FOIA requests.9 As one agency
has observed, "Contrary to expectations there has been very little use of

the FOIA by the general public or the media. The primary users and,
therefore, the chief beneficiaries of the FOIA have been law firms, coror requests. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT, S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 SENATE REPORT],
reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 163; cf.1972 HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 57,
reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 64 (noting a memorandum sent to the heads of
all executive departments and agencies that emphasized that "fees should not be set at an excessive level for the purpose of deterring requests for copies of records").
8. Senate hearings in 1977 indicated that about 80% of FOIA requests at some agencies
were from commercial or business concerns or their law firms. See Hearingson the Freedon of
InformationAct Before the Subcomm on Administrative Practice& Procedureof the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Senate Hearings],
reprintedin part in SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: REPORT ON OVERSIGHT HEARINGS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 n.39
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT]. The General Ac-

counting Office reported somewhat lower figures in a 1978 report and pointed out that a notable
exception to the predominant use of the FOIA by business occurred at the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, where individuals filed most requests. Id On the other hand, a 1979 article stated
that approximately 85% of the requests submitted to the Food and Drug Administration come
from businesses and corporate counsel, as do about 75% of the requests submitted to the Federal
Trade Commission. See Hein, ObtainingAccess to Information in the Files of Government Agencies: The CorporatePerspective, 34 Bus. LAW. 993 (1979).

Similar statistics were reported to the Department of Justice in 1979 by agencies responding
to a survey of the cost and usage of the FOIA. The Food and Drug Administration cited statistics
showing that 85% of its requests came from industry or from FOIA service companies providing
information to industry. The National Labor Relations Board stated that parties to proceedings
before the Board fied 99% of its FOIA appeals. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
of the Department of Agriculture reported that 54% of its requests came from businesses, 10%
from lawyers, and an additional percentage from FOIA service companies. The Comptroller of
the Currency indicated that 75% of its requests were filed by financial institutions, stock analysts,
and the like for statistical information alone (with requests for the other 25% of information presumably also including substantial business usage). The agencies' responses are on file with the
author.
9. See Appendix I for data on the number of FOIA requests and fee-waiver requests in
selected agencies in 1978. The sample represents perhaps one-third of the FOIA requests submitted to the entire federal government.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development accounted for more than half of the
total number of waiver requests in this sample. Excluding these data, the fee-waiver requests744 in number-accompanied only just over one percent of the 59,810 total FOIA requests. There
isgreat variation from agency to agency. For example, in the agencies receiving more than 1,000
FOIA requests in 1978, the percentage of FOIA requests asking for a fee waiver ranged from 7%
to less than 0.1%. Among agencies receiving fewer than 1,000 FOIA requests, the percentage
asking for fee waivers ranged from 19% to less than 1%. In some instances, the numbers in the
table are projected from samples of less than an entire year or samples from 1979 or 1980 because
agencies did not make available full-year data for 1978.
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porations, or individuals who have some type of involvement in specific

cases."' 10 The result, according to another agency, is an "imbalance between information disclosed to vested interests and the public-the

consumer.""
As for the effect of the fee-waiver provision, oversight hearings in
the Senate have led to conclusions that the government has still not
removed the cost barriers to public-benefit requests, that the fee-waiver
provision "is being used to thwart the intent of the law,"' 2 and that
variations in interpretation of the provision have resulted in "unfair
and arbitrary treatment of requesters, and confusion and uncertainty
for the agencies."' 13 This article seeks to assay systematically the feewaiver policies of individual federal agencies and to measure those pol-

icies against the available evidence of the intent of Congress. The
search for agency policies, conducted in Part II, involves the analysis of
all agency regulations, as well as internal policy directives and agency

decisions on administrative appeals, involving fee-waiver requests.' 4
10. United States Customs Service's response to the Department of Justice's 1979 survey (on
file with the author). Likewise, the Environmental Protection Agency stated that business interest
groups it regulates were "the most common beneficiaries" and that "by far the largest volume of

use" was by law firms, corporations, FOIA service companies, and trade associations. The Department of Defense reported that its components believed they were "conducting research for
apparently private and/or commercial purposes at taxpayers' expense." The Social Security Administration and Department of Energy voiced similar complaints; the Veterans Administration
added that the costliest requests to process came "primarily" from the business community. The
Food and Drug Administration expressed the greatest outrage and frustration, stating that under
the FOIA it was serving "primarily as an industrial information pipeline." Only a few agencies
that discussed usage at all did not mention heavy use by business (e.g., the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Office of Management and Budget). The responses rarely mentioned use by public-interest groups or the news media. These responses are on file with the author.
The widespread use of the FOIA for commercial or private purposes includes the filing of
requests (1) by unsuccessful bidders for government contracts seeking to learn why a competitor
had been successful; (2) for lists of names that can be used to solicit business; (3) for information
on competitors' products and installations; (4) by lawyers, economists, or business consultants for
information for use in litigation or regulatory affairs; (5) by employees; (6) by persons being investigated; and (7) by criminals.
11. Food and Drug Administration response to the Department of Justice's 1979 Survey (on
file with the author).
12. 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 78.
13. Id 83.
14. Besides obtaining the published agency regulations on fee waivers, the author filed 137
FOIA requests in order to obtain the appeal decisions rendered by federal agencies. The FOIA
requests also asked for copies of all formal and informal guidelines and policy statements used in
deciding fee-waiver requests, copies of all other internal memoranda and documents, and copies
of the annual FOIA reports the agencies submitted to Congress. Finally, the FOIA requests asked
for the total number of fee waivers applied for, and granted and denied by, each agency in 1978.
The request explained the purpose of the study and requested a fee waiver for the documents
sought.
In follow-up letters to the 33 agencies surveyed by the Senate Subcommittee, the author requested and obtained copies of their responses to a 1977 Subcommittee questionnaire. In addi-
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The search for what the law requires involves a thorough study of the
structure of the current statute and its predecessors as well as a survey
of all legislative materials preceding the adoption of the fee-waiver provision. These materials are discussed in Part III, along with relevant
court decisions. 15 Finally, Part IV offers recommendations intended to
further the purpose of the statute.
II.

AGENCY PRACTICES AND POLICIES

Federal agencies have chosen to carry out the fee-waiver provision
of the FOIA both by promulgating regulations and by using case-bycase decision-making. In many cases agencies have neither specified
fee-waiver policies in regulations nor established a system of precedents, reasons, and indexing for evolving fee-waiver policies from one
decision to another. Agencies that have tried to establish policies have
sometimes encouraged or required the granting of fee waivers to groups
such as government agencies, indigents, nonprofit groups seeking to affect government policy, the news media, historians, scholars, authors,
and universities.
A. Regulations.
Eighty-three regulations concerning FOIA fee waivers, promulgated by various federal agencies, currently exist.' 6 Forty-five of these
regulations, however, provide no guidance in refining the statute's public-benefit standard. The best of this group of regulations merely repeat the words of the statute.' 7 The worst imply that the agency has
more discretion than the statute provides.' 8
tion, the Department of Justice's Office of Information Law and Policy agreed to provide data on
the costs and benefits of the FOIA that it had solicited from all federal agencies in 1979.
15. Published court opinions on fee waivers are rare. Unpublished orders and memoranda
were obtained from the Department of Justice in response to a FOIA request, and from attorneys
for a nonprofit group.
16. See Appendix II. These regulations cover many more than 83 agencies. Although some
departments allow each agency within them to have separate regulations, others have a single
regulation for all their agencies. In some instances, an agency is subject to both agency and departmental regulations.
17. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 15.14(e) (1980) (Department of Housing and Urban Development);
32 C.F.R. § 1900.25(a) (1979) (Central Intelligence Agency); 45 C.F.R. § 612.6(a) (1979) (National
Science Foundation). There are 15 agency regulations of this type. See Hearingson Oversight of
the Administration of the Freedom of InformationAct Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relationsofthe Senate Comm on GovernmentalAffairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Senate Hearings].

18. Twenty of the regulations provide that the FOIA officer "may" waive the fee if furnishing
the information will primarily benefit the public, rather than providing that the officer "shall"
waive the fee under these circumstances, as the statute dictates. See, e.g., 4 C.F.R. § 1206.702(a)
(1980) (National Aeronautics and Space Administration); 29 C.F.R. § 2201.5(c) (1979) (Occupa-
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The thirty-eight regulations that refine the statutory fee-waiver
standard and provide some policy guidance to the agency and the pub-

lic do not uniformly assure that a fee waiver will be given to specified
requesters or for specified purposes. Some of the regulations merely
recognize possible eligibility for a fee waiver, others actually grant an

outright entitlement to fee waivers, and an intermediate group establishes a presumption in favor of fee waivers. 19 The thirty-eight regulations that provide guidance are summarized below in Table A, which

displays the types of requesters recognized as potential waiver recipients, and the number of regulations in each of the categories of eligibil-

ity, presumption, and entitlement.
TABLE

38

A

REGULATIONS AFFECTING AGENCY DISCRETION TO
20
GRANT FEE WAIVERS

TYPES OF REQUESTERS

Government Agencies
Indigents
Nonprofit Groups
News Media
Historians, Scholars,
Authors, Universities
Miscellaneous

NUMBER OF REGULATIONS RECOGNIZING
REQUESTER AS POTENTIAL WAIVER RECIPIENT

Total
27
19
14
8
3
8

Eligibility
14
15
7
3

Presumption
6
3
6
5

Entitlement
7
1
1
0

1
2

2
2

0
4

tional Safety and Health Review Commission); 32 C.F.R. § 2101.22(c) (1979) (National Security
Council). Another ten regulations use the word "may" but do not even mention the statutory
public-benefit test. See, e.g., 1 C.F.R. § 304.6(d) (1980) (Administrative Conference on the U.S.).
See 1980 Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 200-01.
19. The Federal Trade Commission's automatic waiver of fees up to $100 for requests of
journalists, libraries, nonprofit public-interest groups, scholars, and indigents is an example of an
entitlement policy. Federal Trade Comm'n, Staff Bulletin 79-2 (Nov. 21, 1978). A presumption
policy is expressed in the Department of Defense's regulation providing that waiver of fees is
"likely to be warranted" for the news media. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in
32 C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iii)). Eligibility policies typically state only that fees "may" be waived
for various groups. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. pt. 1, subpt. A., app. A, § 4a(3) (1980) (Department of
Agriculture).
20. Appendix II lists the agency regulations that are within each category. Characterizing the
various agency regulations as recognizing eligibility, establishing presumptions, or granting entitlements conveys some impression of the spectrum along which such regulations can lie. But the
task involves a number of judgment calls, and there is room for disagreement about where on the
spectrum to place some of the regulations.
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Most of these regulations refer to the requester's identity, not to
the use for which the requester seeks the documents. For example, the
Department of Defense's presumptive waiver for the "Public Information News Media" refers to journalists rather than journalism. 21 Because most of the regulations do not entitle a requester to receive a fee
waiver, the agency may grant waivers for some uses and not for others
even when requests come from the identified requesters. The actual
waiver determination is thus made on a case-by-case basis. Although
some of the regulations do categorize uses as well as requesters, 22 they
usually specify a rather narrow band of uses and also stop short of
setting firm policy, instead recognizing only eligibility for a waiver and
not granting a presumption or entitlement.
The relative rarity of regulations creating presumptions of entitlement to waivers or outright entitlements to waivers probably results
from a concern that the overall cost of fee waivers would become prohibitive under such regulations. Some agencies have made that concern explicit by requiring in their fee-waiver regulations that waiver
requests be decided on the basis of their cost to the agency, the reason23
ableness of the request, or a balance of costs against benefits.
Of course, collecting a fee may sometimes be more expensive than
waiving it, because of the cost of the billing process. 24 Many agencies
have therefore established fee thresholds below which they will not
charge search and copying fees regardless of the requester's identity or
21. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in 32 C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iii)).
22. For example, 4 of the 27 regulations mentioning waivers for government agencies restrict
such waivers to situations in which the documents will be used to promote the objectives of the
agency releasing the documents. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 20,43(a)(5) (1980) (Food and Drug Administration). Five of the 14 regulations mentioning waivers for nonprofit groups or activities require
that the requester be engaged in an activity "promoting public safety, health, or welfare." See,
e.g., 7 C.F.R. pt. 1, subpt. A, app. A, § 4a(3) (1980) (Department of Agriculture). One regulation
recognizing congressional committees as automatically deserving fee waivers makes an exception
to that policy if the documents will be used "for the benefit of an individual Member of Congress
or for a constituent." See 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(6) (1980) (Environmental Protection Agency).
23. The Department of Transportation appears to limit fee waivers to "reasonable" requests.
49 C.F.R. § 7.97(c) (1980). The Department of Defense has a similar provision for the news media. See 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in 32 C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iii)). Seven
agencies allow waivers to be denied because of a burden on the agency or because of a balancing
of costs against likely public benefits. See 10 C.F.R. § 9.14(e), 9.14a(b), 9.14a(d)(6) (1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d) (1980) (Small Business Administration); 15
C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(4) (1980) (Department of Commerce); 18 C.F.R. § 701.203(a)-(c) (1980) (Water
Resources Council); 29 C.F.R. § 1401.36(d)(3) (1979) (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service); 31 C.F.R. § 1.6(d)(l) (1980) (Department of Treasury); 45 C.F.R. § 704.1(e)(3)(i) (1979)
(Commission on Civil Rights).
24. The Federal Power Commission determined that in 1972 it could have collected $17,000
in fees arising from 34,000 search requests. The billing cost would have been $17,600. See 1972
House REPORT, supra note 3, at 59, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 66.
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the purpose for which he requests the documents. 25 At least three
agencies have a two-level system in which the fee threshold for certain

presumptively eligible groups such as nonprofit organizations is four to
26
ten times as high as for other requesters.

B.

Case-by-Case Decisions.
Notwithstanding the few agency regulations offering entitlements

or presumptions of entitlement to certain categories of requesters or
types of use, and the widespread practice of establishing fee thresholds,
the vast majority of agencies have chosen not to make firm policy determinations in their regulations. The second phase of the author's
study sought to determine if agencies were making fee-waiver policy
through case-by-case adjudication, either formal or informal. The author asked each agency for copies of all appeal decisions rendered since

the 1974 FOIA amendments took effect. 27 Most agencies had no appeal decisions on fee waivers, but twenty-five agencies provided with-

out charge a total of 210 appeal decisions. 28 Two issues are important

25. The 1974 Senate would have imposed a three-dollar fee threshold for all agencies by
explicitly providing that no fees would be charged when the amount was less than that amount.
1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 12, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 164.
Although the final bill that emerged from the Conference Committee did not contain this provision, many agencies adopted the concept. Today, after seven years of inflation, several of these
agencies still have a threshold of three dollars or less. Others have raised their free-copy thresholds to $25 or more (or 250 pages of free copying). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, after
determining that the average cost of making individualized decisions on fee-waiver requests was
$80, Memorandum 9 (Sept. 8, 1978) (on file with the author), raised its automatic waiver of search
fees to cover four hours of search time. Policy from agency to agency varies widely regarding the
amount of the threshold, as well as regarding whether the threshold refers to copying fees, search
fees, or both. Tables 1-4 in Appendix III summarize agency practices regarding fee thresholds.
26. See Federal Trade Comn'n, Staff Bulletin 79-2 (Nov. 21, 1978) ($10 for general requests,
$100 for indigents in litigation, journalists, libraries, nonprofit public-interest groups, and scholars); Forest Service, FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 6271.72-.74 (1980) ($10 for general requests, $50
for nonprofit groups, libraries, scholars, and authors in nonprofit journals); 45 C.F.R.
§ 1602.13(b), (c) (1979) ($6.50 for general requests, $25 for indigents) (Legal Services Corporation).
27. The more numerous initial decisions were not analyzed. Studying the appeal decisions
not only is a more manageable task, but also reflects agency policies more accurately.
28. Eighty-two agencies reported that there had been no appeals of fee-waiver denials. The
remaining 31 agencies, however, included some of the largest agencies and those with the greatest
amount of FOIA activity. Six of these never sent copies of their appeal decisions. Most of the 25
agencies that sent appeal decisions sent all of their decisions since 1974; a few provided only
samples. Of the 210 appeal decisions, 175 (83%) denied waivers and 35 (17%) overruled initial
determinations and therefore granted a waiver or reduction of fees. This overall pattern recurred
in almost every individual agency. Only two of the 25 agencies granted more waivers on appeal
than they denied, with one agency ordering waivers in eight out of nine appeals.
With respect to initial requests (as distinguished from appeals), limited data indicate that of
14 agencies with at least five fee-waiver requests and at least $50,000 in claimed FOIA administration costs during 1978-a sample selected to exclude agencies that have not had enough waiver
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to determine whether an agency uses the case-by-case process to evolve
policy: (1) whether an agency maintains a usable, indexed file of prior
decisions, and whether it uses those decisions as precedents in subse-

quent decisions; and (2) whether an agency explains the reasons for its
decisions, and what those reasons are.
1. Precedents, Consistency,Availabilitfy, andIndexing. In the 210

appeal decisions examined, only once did an agency openly cite as precedent a prior agency decision on fee waivers.2 9 Although some FOIA
appeal officers or agency lawyers have sent internal memoranda to
agency personnel suggesting that they take previous appeal decisions as
guidance for their decisions, 3 0 most agencies having appeal decisions

on fee waivers do not keep them in a separate file that is readily available for consultation by members of the public or even by agency personnel in order to determine precedents and policy. In agencies

keeping FOIA fee-waiver decisions in a common file with other FOIA
decisions, there usually are not systems of indexing that facilitate the
finding of decisions about fee waivers. 31 Not surprisingly, the more numerous initial decisions on fee waivers are even more difficult to obtain
32
than the appeal decisions.
requests to develop a pattern--six granted waivers over 90% of the time, three over 80% of the
time, three approximately 50% of the time, and two essentially 0% of the time. Including these 14
agencies and others that had fewer than five waiver requests, or had small expenses attributable to
the FOIA, or had both, approximately 75% of the fee-waiver requests were granted initially, and
25% denied. The bulk of these waiver awards were probably for relatively few documents, for
agencies commonly deny fee waivers that might become burdensome. See text accompanying
note 40 infra.

29. In that case the United States Postal Service granted a waiver of a few dollars after a
prisoner pointed out that another prisoner had received a waiver from the agency in similar circumstances. (The decision is on file with the author.)
30. See, e.g., Memorandum from Department of Justice (Mar. 14, 1979) (on file with the
author); Memorandum from Freedom of Information (Appeals) Officer, Department of Interior
(Sept. 14, 1979) (on file with the author). In one instance, the Department of Justice denied a
waiver on the basis of "the internal administrative precedents of this Department," without telling
the requester what decisions constituted the precedents. Letter from Department of Justice (July
7, 1978) (on file with the author).
31. Typical agency responses to requests for copies of fee-waiver appeal decisions for this
study were that "we would have to retrieve all of the case files from our records center and examine them" (Central Intelligence Agency), that "information dating back to 1974 is not assembled in a way that makes it readily retrievable" (General Services Administration), that finding
fee-waiver appeals would require "a search of every record relating to any appeals since 1974"
(Department of Treasury), that FOIA appeals are not indexed on the basis of substance (Internal
Revenue Service), or that it would take a "document by document search" to find waiver appeal
decisions (Office of Personnel Management). (The responses are on file with the author.)
32. Most agencies had great difficulty in responding to this study's request for the numbers of
initial decisions granting and denying fee waivers during 1978, or for copies of the actual grants
and denials.
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The absence of an indexing system for prior decisions hinders consistent agency decision-making. Although standard boilerplate language in appeals decisions by some agencies suggests that their internal
policy is somewhat consistent, 33 the study revealed many inconsistencies. One agency informed some requesters that indigency qualified
them for waivers but told others that it did not.34 Another agency denied a waiver to a nonprofit group appealing the actions of a local
agency office, but later granted a waiver to another similarly situated
nonprofit group.35 A third agency instructed a representative of a nonprofit group in Washington State that he must travel to New York in
order to inspect voluminous documents instead of getting a waiver, and
then informed a private Washington, D.C., lawyer that he need not
travel two miles to inspect voluminous documents but would get a
waiver instead. 36 In none of these cases did the agency explain the apparent inconsistency.
2. Explanationof Reasons. The study also examined the 210 appeal decisions to determine how often they explained the reasons for
their actions. In half the decisions the agencies did not explain their
reasons. Most of these decisions, instead, merely cited the statute's
public-benefit standard without explaining how the requester had or
had not met the standard. 37 A few decisions denying waivers recited
several factors the agency had "considered" without indicating whether
the requester failed to satisfy a particular factor, failed to satisfy them
38
all, or failed to qualify under a balancing of factors.
When an agency did give reasons for denying or granting a waiver,
it commonly used boilerplate language. The reasons can be grouped
into four broad categories: (1) that providing documents to the particular requester or for the particular request would or would not benefit
the public; 39 (2) that the cost of providing documents would or would
33. For one of many discussions of this type of self-imposed limitation, see Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrati'e Justice, 37 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1972).
34. United States Postal Service (decision on fie with the author).
35. Forest Service (decisions on file with the author).
36. Environmental Protection Agency (decisions on file with the author).
37. In one-fourth of the appeal decisions that gave no reasons for the agency's actions, the
requester had made mere conclusory statements that his request would benefit the general public,
but in the other three-fourths the agency decision was conclusory even though the requester had
made specific arguments for eligibility.
38. In eight percent of the appeals, an agency cited an agency regulation on fee waivers, but
many of these regulations themselves simply repeated the statutory public-benefit standard, endorsed agency discretion, or listed several criteria that might be considered.
39. This category most clearly applies the statute's public-benefit test. (Whether these decisions properly applied the test is discussed in the text accompanying notes 167-98 infra.) Twenty
of these 77 reasons, contained in 68 appeal decisions, informed requesters-usually prison in-
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not be too high; 40 (3) that the documents were not likely to be useful to

the requester; and (4) that the documents were already available to the
public or could be inspected by the requester or the public. 4 ' The appeal decisions are summarized below in Table B. Because some decisions give more than one reason, the total of the four categories exceeds

the total number of decisions giving reasons.
TABLE

B

ANALYSIS OF APPEAL DECISIONS

Frequency of Reasons
Reasons Not Given
Reasons Given
Total Decisions
Major Categories of Reasons Given
Private Benefit
Cost
Lack of Usefulness
Availability, Inspection
III.

105
105
210
77
41
5
23

EVALUATION OF AGENCY PRACTICES AND POLICIES

The discussion in Part II indicates that most agencies have not
specified the details of a fee-waiver policy in their regulations, nor established policy through the use of precedents in case-by-case appeal
decisions. The lack of explanations in half the case-by-case appeal de-

cisions also illustrates the avoidance of policy-making and policy-stating. In those instances in which decisions have stated reasons, certain
categories of reasons tend to recur regularly. We now examine the statmates-that indigency did not qualify a requester for a fee waiver. Three decisions, however, held
that indigents did qualify for a waiver. Agencies also denied waivers on lack-of-public-benefit
grounds in cases involving commercial enterprises, labor unions, and contract disputes with the
agency. Decisions differed whether universities, libraries, authors, and nonprofit groups qualified
for waivers, and whether a requester must represent a large segment of the public or provide wide
dissemination of information in order to qualify for a fee waiver.
40. Most of the decisions denying waivers on the basis of cost stated that information could
be found only after an extensive search or that, on balance, conserving public funds would serve
the public better than a waiver. In one instance the agency denied a waiver because waivers had
been granted to the same environmental group in the past and the agency considered the waivers,
totaling $120, to have been expensive. Forest Service (decision on file with the author). A few
decisions used low cost as a basis for granting a waiver.
41. In 13 of these 23 cases, the information was said to be already available, but the requester
was not told where. In at least two of the ten cases in which the agency cited the availability of
inspection in an agency reading room as an alternative to disclosure with a fee waiver, the requester was located on the west coast and the documents were on the east coast.
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ute, the legislative history, and court decisions to determine the congressional policy with respect to these procedural and substantive issues
involved in FOIA fee waivers and to determine whether current agency
practices are consistent with the congressional policy.
Three expressions of government opinion on these issues require
particular attention, both because they offer widely diverging views on
many of the issues and because they were authored by two of the most
important participants in the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act: the Department of Justice and the Senate Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure.
The Department of Justice, in its role as adviser to the agencies
within the executive branch, issued an Attorney General's Memorandum in 1975, just before the 1974 FOIA amendments took effect. 42 The
memorandum stated that agencies "need not employ any particular
formalized procedure" for dealing with fee waivers, that they need not
"develop a system of rigid guidelines or inflexible case precedents"
(though "[d]eliberate, irrational discrimination between one case and
the next is of course improper"), and that an agency's duty is to "consider exercising its discretion" to waive fees if the agency perceived a
"substantial question" whether there might be public benefit. 43 Regarding substantive law on fee waivers, the memorandum stated that
waiver or reduction of fees doubtless "is discretionary," though it listed
five specific criteria that might be pertinent to what it termed "the appropriateness of public payment." 44 The memorandum cited no legislative history either for its procedural advice that agencies need not
develop rigid guidelines or inflexible case precedents, or as the source
of the five criteria for making substantive decisions. The only legal
support it cited was a five-word phrase from the 1974 Conference Re42. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE 1974 AMEND-

MENT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (Feb. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 1975 MEMORANDUM], reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 507. Although
prepared quickly, this memorandum was the product of an "extensive consultative process." The
memorandum did "not purport to be exhaustive" and solicited further comments from the agencies and the public. Id iii, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 509.
43. Id 15, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 525.
44. Id 15-16, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 525-26. The criteria are:
"[T]he size of the public to be benefited, the significance of the benefit, the private interest of the
requester which the release may further, the usefulness of the material to be released, [and] the
likelihood that tangible public good will be realized." Id 15, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 3, at 525.
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port referring to a "discretionary public-interest waiver authority" and
45
an italicization of two phrases in the statute itself.
The Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, which plays a key role in overseeing the Act, issued a staff report
in 1980, five years after the Attorney General's Memorandum.4 6 The
report analyzed and criticized the limited degree to which agencies had
used regulations to make fee-waiver policy determinations, the procedures agencies used in case-by-case decisions, and the substance of
agency regulations and decisions.47 The report urged the Department
of Justice to develop specific guidelines recommending that all agencies
"provide by regulation for specific fee waivers" 48 for certain designated
categories of requesters, and consider other requests less arbitrarily.4 9
These guidelines would also require agencies to "explain in detail why
a fee waiver or reduction is not granted," an explanation that "should
be more than a mere recitation of the current statutory language" 50 ),
require agencies to provide for administrative appeals as a "check" on
fee-waiver decisions, and allow only policy-level employees or their
designees to deny waivers.
In addition to proposing these procedural requirements, the report
made some substantive recommendations. It suggested that agencies
grant presumptions of entitlement to fee waivers to indigents, "news
media representatives, researchers and scholars, and representatives of
non-profit, public interest groups. ' '5 ' The report's call for categorical or
presumptive waivers accompanied a criticism of agencies that deny
waivers because a request is "too broad or voluminous" or because
"[c]ompliance with the request will be too costly when balanced against
the public benefit." 52 The report urged that the Department of Justice
should refuse to defend an agency in court against challenges to its feewaiver regulations, procedures, or policies if the agency has disobeyed
45. Id 16, reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 526 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
COMM. REP., H.R. REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT]).
46. 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 8.
47. Seegeneraliyid 77-97. The report followed oversight hearings in 1977, in which Senator
Abourezk, the subcommittee chairman, had decried the fact that the interpretation of the statute's
public-benefit language varies "to an alarming degree." 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at
152, reprinted in part in 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 83.
48. 1980 SENATE SUBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 91.
49. Id
50. Id 97.

§ 552(a)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1974) and CONF.

51. Id 96. Requesters not in these categories would still be eligible for waivers, but would
not have the benefit of the presumption.
52. Id 90.
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the department's guidelines. 53 The Subcommittee Report cited no legislative history to support its recommendations.
In January 1981 the Attorney General issued a two-page memorandum devoted to substantive fee-waiver policy, because "the Federal
Government often fails to grant fee waivers. . . when requesters have
demonstrated" eligibility for such waivers. 54 The Attorney General's
1981 Memorandum repeated the 1975 view that fee waivers are a matter of discretion, but stated that "Congress clearly intended that this
discretion be exercised generously" whenever the "content of the
records being released" or the "identity of the requester" suggests that
the public interest would be served thereby.5 5 The memorandum even
gave examples of potential fee-waiver recipients, namely "representatives of the news media or public interest organizations, and historical
researchers. ' 56 While it recognized the statutory possibility of granting
reductions of fees rather than waivers, it stated that "in all appropriate
cases, complete rather than partial waivers should be granted. ' 57 The
Attorney General further cautioned against agencies' using improper
criteria in deciding fee waivers: "Neither individual prejudices regarding what constitutes the public interest nor such impermissible considerations as the quantity of material likely to be released after
processing have any place in our application of a sound fee waiver policy."5 8s No legislative history or discussion of cases appears in the Attorney General's 1981 Memorandum, nor in the twenty-two page
discussion of fee-waiver policy by the Department of Justice's Office of
Information Law and Policy (OILP) 59 attached to the memorandum,
although three brief pages in an appendix to the OILP memorandum
do touch lightly on legal sources. 60
These three expressions of government opinion over a six-year period give conflicting views on the procedural obligations of federal
agencies to develop policies through regulations or reasons stated in
53. Id 96.
54. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MPMORANDUM, SUBJECT: FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION ACT FEE WAIVERS (Jan. 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

1981

MEMORANDUM].

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id 1.
Id 1-2.
Id 2.
Id.
OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW AND POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM,

SUBJECT- INTERIM FEE WAIVER POLICY FOR ADMINISTERING THE PROVISION FOR WAIVER OR
REDUCTION OF SEARCH AND DUPLICATION FEES IN SUBSECTION (a)(4)(A) OF THE FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Dec. 18, 1980) [hereinafter cited as OILP's 1980
MEMORANDUM], summarized in 49 U.S.L.W. 2475 (Jan. 27, 1981).
60. OILP's 1980 MEMORANDUM, supra note 59, App. A ("The Statutory Fee Waiver Provision, Legislative History, and Case Law").
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case-by-case precedents. As for substantive fee-waiver policy, the two
more recent expressions of opinion both favor a presumption of entitlement to fee waivers for bona fide representatives of the news media,
nonprofit groups, and researchers; the statements do not, however,
agree on the issues of indigency and cost. A thorough exploration of
the applicable law has been lacking until now, however. Such a discussion should help the government, the public, and the courts put feewaiver policies on a sounder footing.
A. ProceduralIssues.
1. Rulemaking. (a) Case law background. Generally, agencies
have the right to decide whether to develop policy through regulations
or through a case-by-case approach. The Supreme Court opinion in
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I 61 is commonly quoted for the proposition that "the choice. . . between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, adhoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency,"' 62 and for its statement that
"the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-tocase basis if the administrative process is to be effective. ' '63 The Chenery II Court's endorsement of case-by-case decisions was not, however, intended to give agencies free reign from one case to the next.
' 64
The opinion speaks of the "case by case evolution of standards.
Neither did the Court hold that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies completely within the agency's discretion. Indeed, it
stated that an agency possessing rulemaking power "has less reason to
rely upon ad hoc adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct."65 The Court also recommended that an agency should fill in the
interstices of a broadly-worded statute "as much as possible, through
[the] quasi-legislative promulgation of rules .... -66
Several cases in the last two decades have imposed rulemaking requirements on agencies though the statutes did not require rulemaking.67 One particularly striking opinion, which could be relevant to an
61. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
62. Id at 203.
63. Id
64. Id at 202.
65. Id
66. Id
67. The holdings have usually been based on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (a vagrancy ordinance violates the due process
clause when there are no administrative standards "governing the exercise of the discretion

granted by the ordinance"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758-59
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application for a FOIA fee waiver, was the Supreme Court's opinion in
Morton v. Ruiz. 68 The Court held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs
could not deny an application for welfare benefits by certain Indians on
the basis of case-by-case decisionmaking and unpublished require-

ments. Instead, legislative-type rules were required to accomplish that
result. The Court went as far as to condemn "the inherently arbitrary

nature of unpublished ad hoc determinations," which the Administrative Procedure Act 69 was said to forbid. 70 The Court stated that "the

determination of eligibility cannot be made on an ad hoc basis by the
dispenser of funds,"7' that the power to administer a federal program
necessarily requires rules to fill any gaps left by Congress, 72 and that an

applicant within the class Congress presumptively intended to benefit
can be excluded on the basis of limited available funds only through
73
rulemaking.
(D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge panel) (per Leventhal, J.) (rejecting a claim that the broad statutory
language of a wage-price stabilization law created an unconstitutional delegation of power and
upholding the law because, among other reasons, "any action taken by the Executive. . .must be
in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive"). Decisions have often involved the granting of requests for government benefits. See, e.g., White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d
750, 754 (7th Cir. 1976) (a government decision whether to grant or deny requests for welfare
benefits must be rendered under "written standards and regulations"; "unfettered discretion"
vested in the welfare administrator violates due process); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968) (a government decision whether to grant or deny requests for
government-subsidized housing must "be made in accordance with 'ascertainable standards' ");
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964) (a government decision whether to grant or
deny requests for liquor licenses violates due process if the requester is "not afforded an opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the board, of the objective standards
which had to be met to obtain a license"). Occasionally the decisions have relied on administrative common law or notions of fairness. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (per Burger, J.) ("considerations of basic fairness require administrative regulations"
establishing standards for debarment from government contracts). The movement toward requiring rulemaking may be due largely to the prompting of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. In the
1970 supplement to his treatise, Professor Davis argued that the need to protect against the arbitrary exercise of discretionary power "should gradually grow into a requirement, judicially enforced, that administrators must strive to do as much as they can reasonably do to develop and to
make known the needed confinements of discretionary power through standards, principles, and
rules." K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRTIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.13, at 278-79 (Supp. 1970). There may be
a federal common law of administrative law, see Davis, Administrative Common Law and the
Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 3; if so, rulemaking could be judicially imposed
without constitutional or statutory interpretation, ef.Megdal v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 288 Or. 293, 322-24, 605 P.2d 273, 287 (1980) (Denecke, C.J., concurring) (a reviewing court
has common-law power to require rulemaking). Some commentators have criticized the push for
judicially required rulemaking. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1699-1702 (1975).
68. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
69. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976).
70. 415 U.S. at 232.
71. Id
72. Id at 231.
73. Id at 236.
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The Supreme Court's subseqpuent decision in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co 74 reaffirmed the validity of Chenery 11.75 Nevertheless, Ruiz

indicates that under some circumstances courts will limit an agency's
76
freedom to choose between rulemaking and adjudication.

(b) Statute andlegislativehistory. One obvious situation in which
courts will limit the normal freedom of agencies to choose is when
Congress has directed an agency to use rulemaking rather than adjudication. The fee-waiver provision provides simply that waivers are to be
77
granted when the "agency determines" there is a public benefit.
These bare words do not reveal whether such determinations must be

made in regulations or in case-by-case decisions. But the report of the
House-Senate Conference Committee states that instead of legislating a
"list of specific categories" of persons entitled to fee waivers as the Sen-

ate bill had proposed, the Conferees intended that the task would be
left to "individual agency determination in regulations" implementing
the FOIA. 78 It is puzzling that the Attorney General's 1975 Memoran74. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
75. The Court emphasized in Bell-Aerospace, as it had in Chenery II, that it understood the
federal agency to be in the process of "developing its standards" through its case-by-case decisions. Id at 294. See also NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 668 (1976).
76. In Bell-Aerospace the Court stated that there was no reason to require rulemaking, 416
U.S. at 294, but in Ruiz it stated that there was no reason to dispense with rulemaking, 415 U.S. at
234-35. One reason for the differing presumptions may be that Ruiz involved the granting of
government benefits, see note 67 supra, while Bell-Aerospace did not. This distinction implies that
there should be a presumption in favor of rulemaking to govern fee waivers, which are also government benefits.
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976), set out in part in the text accompanying note 7 supra.
78. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 8, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, stpra
note 3, at 225. The discussion of fee waivers in the Conference Report consists of only three
paragraphs. Because they are so important to ascertaining the legislative intent, they are set out
below:
The Senate amendment contained a provision, not included in the House bill, directing the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to promulgate regulations
establishing a uniform schedule of fees for agency search and copying of records made
available to a person upon request under the law. It also provided that an agency could
furnish the records requested without charge or at a reduced charge if it determined that
such action would be in the public interest. It further provided that no fees should ordinarily be charged if the person requesting the records was an indigent, if such fees would
amount to less than $3, if the records were not located by the agency, or if they were
determined to be exempt from disclosure under subsection (b) of the law.
The conference substitute follows the Senate amendment, except that each agency
would be required to issue its own regulations for the recovery of only the direct costs of
search and duplication-not including examination or review of records-instead of
having such regulations promulgated by the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the conference substitute retains the agency's discretionary public-interest waiver
authority but eliminates the specific categories of situations where fees should not be
charged.
By eliminating the list of specific categories, the conferees do not intend to imply
that agencies should actually charge fees in those categories. Rather, they felt, such matters are properly the subject for individual agency determination in regulations implementing the Freedom of Information law. The conferees intend that fees should not be
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dum did not discuss this latter phrase. The memorandum's assertion
that agencies could avoid "rigid guidelines," 79 which has led many
agencies to promulgate regulations that do not refine the statutory public-benefit standard, should have been tempered somewhat by this evidence of legislative intent that agencies are to make fee-waiver policies
through rulemaking. 80 The agencies may not-have a responsibility to
promulgate "rigid" guidelines, but they do have a responsibility to promulgate regulations governing specific categories of requests for which

fees are to be waived.
(c) Court interpretation. The only court decision to consider what
a regulation must contain to satisfy the agency's rulemaking obligation
is National Consumers Congress v. Agency for InternationalDevelopment. 8 ' The District Court for the District of Columbia held, because
of the language quoted above from the Conference Report,8 2 that subsection (4)(A) "imposes on each agency a duty to promulgate regulations setting forth the basic standards to be considered by the agency in
making fee waiver determinations." 8 3 The court went on to find, however, that the agency's fee-waiver regulation, which "amounts to little
more than a paraphrase of the statutory 'public interest' standard," was
adequate for use in 1975 "as applied to plaintiffs,"8 4 who had filed a
FOIA request on the same day that the 1974 FOIA amendments and
the agency's regulations took effect. The court stated that agencies
could exercise discretion about the degree of detail to include in "early
used for the purpose of discouraging requests for information or as obstacles to disclosure of requested information.
Id
79. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
80. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 8, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 225. This phrase in the Conference Report takes on more meaning when one considers
the context of the sentence on fee waivers in subsection (a)(4)(A) of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(A) (1976). The first sentence of subsection (a)(4)(A) directs each federal agency to
"promulgate regulations. . . specifying a uniform schedule of fees" for the entire agency. The
second sentence states that "[s]uch fees" shall be limited to reasonable standard charges and cover
only the direct costs of search and duplication. The third sentence then speaks of fee waivers.
Obviously, the second sentence's standardization of fees from one requester to the next and limitation of fees to direct costs could be implemented only in the regulations of the first sentence. The
connecting words "such fees" are not in the third sentence--the fee-waiver sentence-but the
requirement that documents be provided "without charge" or at a "reduced charge" must be a
reference to the "charges" described in the second sentence. In any event, Congress likely intended all three sentences in the subsection to operate together, rather than in isolation, particularly because the first sentence describes the fee-charging process generally ("In order to carry out
the provisions of this section, each agency shall promulgate regulations").
81. No. 75-1209 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1976).
82. See text accompanying note 78 supra.
83. No. 75-1209, slip op. at 10.
84. Id
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formulations of the required regulation," 5 quoting the Supreme Court
for the proposition that essential principles need not be cast "immediately" into the mold of a general rule because some principles "must
await their own development. ' 86 The court would permit an agency to
use a case-by-case approach in defining eligibility for fee waivers as
"long as the agency lacks adequate experience in applying the statutory
standard" and stressed "the novelty of the 1974 fee waiver amendment
87
during the time when the agency was considering plaintiffs' request.
Finally, the court stated that the agency would be acting reasonably in
a situation.of early application of the statutory standard if it chose to
"articulate the determinative criteria in more detail on a case-by-case
88
basis."
The NationalConsumers Congress court was careful to specify that
its forbearance in not imposing a requirement of more detailed
rulemaking was based on the newness of the statutory scheme and on
the court's expectation of a detailed articulation and evolution of criteria on a case-by-case basis. Today, after six years of experience with
the provision, with hundreds of fee-waiver requests being handled each
year for the government as a whole, use of the case-by-case process has
rarely led to articulation of fee-waiver criteria in such decisions. Most
agencies not only have avoided setting "rigid guidelines," as the Attorney General's 1975 Memorandum said they could, 89 but also have
avoided setting any guidelines at all. If a fee-waiver applicant today
established that an agency's regulation lacked the specific categories
expected by the Conference Committee and further showed that the
agency had failed to explain its denial of the applicant's request, failed
to keep track of its previous decisions and thereby evolve policy, failed
to establish an indexing system, and failed to promulgate rules that expressed even presumptive agency policy decisions, a court would probably invalidate the regulation.
2. Case-by-Case Decisions. The issues arising with respect to
case-by-case decision-making can be grouped conveniently into two
overall categories: those involving the use of precedents, including the
filing and indexing of waiver decisions, and those involving the agencies' explanations of reasons for their decisions.
85. Id., slip op. at 11.
86. Id (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947)).
87. No. 75-1209, slip op. at 11.
88. Id., slip op. at 11-12.
89. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
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(a) Precedents,consistency, availability,and indexing. When an

agency takes action through formal adjudication, 90 it cannot "treat similar situations in dissimilar ways" without explanation. 9 1 Like courts,
agencies engaged in formal adjudication must either follow precedents
or distinguish them so that they create a body of agency law or policy.
The law has been moving toward recognizing a similar duty of consis-

tency when agencies take case-by-case actions that are not "formal"
adjudications. 92 In the case of fee-waiver decisions under the FOIA,

which are among such informal actions, the Attorney General's 1975
Memorandum acknowledged a duty to render consistent decisions, by

saying that "deliberate, irrational discrimination between one case and
the next is of course improper. ' 93 Despite this advice, some instances
of apparent inconsistency within agencies in deciding factually similar
fee-waiver requests were discovered in the study this author con94
ducted.

The controversial question is whether an agency also has an obligation to make available a file consisting of all fee-waiver decisions

available and index that file so that the agency and the public can consult it. As indicated above, few agencies have such systems. 95 The Attorney General's 1975 Memorandum advised that agencies are not

'96 If
required to "develop a system of. . . inflexible case precedents.
this means that agencies need not develop any system for keeping track

97
of precedents at all, this advice is inconsistent with the FOIA itself.
In addition to providing in section 552(a)(3) for the availability of gov-

ernment documents on request, the Act requires in section 552(a)(2)

that unpublished agency orders and instructions that affect members of
90. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
91. See Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (quoting Herbert Harvey, Inc.
v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 770, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
92. These informal actions range from issuing drivers' licenses to giving private letter rulings
on income tax deductions, from denials of parole to decisions not to issue unfair labor practices
complaints. Scholars have focused attention increasingly in recent decades on the quality of justice or fairness and the obligation of consistency from one decision to the next in such informal
actions. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1969); J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY (1978); J. JOWELL, LAW AND BUREAUCRACY: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ACTION (1975).

93. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 1975 MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 15, reprinted in 1975
supra note 3, at 525.
94. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.

SOURCE BOOK,

95.

See text accompanying note 31 supra.

96. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 1975 MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 15, reprintedin 1975
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 525. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
97. On the other hand, if the memorandum meant only that precedent systems need not be
inflexible, such a statement would be true because agencies as well as courts need not follow
precedents if they can distinguish them. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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the public be made available and be indexed. 98 The House Report on
the 1966 Act explained the kinds of agency decisions that would become available and be indexed under subsection (a)(2):
As the Federal Government has extended its activities to solve the
Nation's expanding problems-and particularly in the 20 years since
the Administrative Procedure Act was established-the bureaucracy
has developed its own form of case law. This law is embodied in
thousands of orders, opinions, statements, and instructions issued by
hundreds of agencies. This is the material which would be made
available under [section 552(a)(2)]. 99

The Attorney General's 1975 Memorandum commented that
"[t]he primary purpose of subsection (a)(2) was to compel disclosure of
what has been called 'secret law'.

.

.."t00The memorandum went on

to state, however, that the subsection should be confined to orders in
"structured, relatively formal proceedings ..... "101

The Supreme

Court implicitly rejected this position by holding, in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co. ,102 that a decision by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board not to proceed with unfair labor practice
charges-a decision that is not the product of a structured, formal proceeding-is an order for the availability purposes of section 552(a)(2).
The court applied section 552(a)(2) simply because such a decision is a
"final disposition.

. .

of an agency in a matter."' 0 3 Because decisions

granting or denying fee waivers are also final dispositions, they must
also be considered orders that must be made available and indexed
pursuant to section 552(a)(2). Application of the availability and indexing requirement of subsection (a)(2) to fee-waiver decisions would
result in development of a system of case decisions, which would become an "ever-expanding library of precedents to which an agency
98. The organized bar was the prime advocate for this provision. See I J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE § 2.02 n.21 (1980).

99. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE
RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966),
reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 28.
100. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 1975 MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 19, reprinted in 1975
SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 529.
101. Id 20, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 530.
102. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).

103. Id at 158 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976)). See also National Prison Project of the
ACLU, Inc. v. Sigler, 390 F. Supp. 789, 792-93 (D.D.C. 1975) (section 552(a)(2) applies to decisions on parole applications by the United States Board of Parole). The Attorney General also
argued unsuccessfully that section 552(a)(2) was limited to orders and interpretations that might
be relied on as precedents. See id at 793; Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298,
1303-05 (D.D.C. 1973), modfed and remanded on othergrounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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must adhere or explain its deviation,"' 04 thus resulting in the evolution
of standards contemplated by Chenery II.
(b) Explanation of reasons. Section 552(a)(6)(A) of the Freedom
of Information Act specifically requires agencies denying FOIA re-

quests to explain their reasons.'0 5 The salient question is whether this
subsection applies to fee-waiver requests. The words of the subsection
expressly make it applicable only to a "request for records" made
under subsections (a)(1), (2), or (3). One could argue that a request for
records that includes a request for a fee waiver is actually two separate
requests, and that the fee-waiver component of the request is a request
under subsection (a)(4), not a request "for records" under subsections

(a)(1), (2), or (3). Such an argument would be incorrect. A request for
records that includes a request for a fee waiver must be considered a
request made entirely under subsection (a)(3), because subsection (a)(4)
contains no separate procedure for requesting fee waivers; instead it
merely spells out an agency's duties with regard to promulgating fee
regulations. Indeed, subsection (a)(3) refers to the "fees (if any)" in
connection with a request, thus indicating that fee-waiver issues are

part of a subsection (a)(3) request.10 6 Finally, if a fee-waiver request is
not a request for records under subsection (a)(3), then subsection

(a)(6)(A)'s other requirements-that an agency respond to requests
within ten days and provide for appeal of a denial to the head of the
104. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 582 (Fla. App. 1977) (commenting on the requirement in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.53(2) (West Supp. 1979), Florida's counterpart to section 552(a)(2), to index all orders).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) (1976) (emphasis added):
Each a ency, upon any request for records made under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of this
subsectIon, shall(i) determine within ten days (excepting Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after the receipt of any such request whether to comply with such request and shall
immediately notify theperson making such request of such determinationand the reasons
therefor, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse
determination ....
In addition, section 555(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency explain "the grounds for denial" of any written request filed with the agency "in connection with
any agency proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1976). The House and Senate committee reports for
the Act said the provision applies "in any agency proceeding, whether or not formal or upon
hearing." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, 265 (1946); see K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIEs § 16.00-5, at 392 (1976).
106. Section 552(a)(3) provides:
Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (I) and (2) of
this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time,
place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly
available to any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
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agency-would also be inapplicable. 07 Nothing in the legislative history suggests an intent to provide lesser procedural safeguards for persons avowing an intent to benefit the general public than for requesters
with private purposes and financial resources. Indeed, the legislative
history reveals the opposite intent-to favor public-interest reques8
ters.10
That the "reasons" requirement applies to fee waivers gains additional support from litigation dealing with the judicial review of feewaiver denials. Subsection (a)(4)(B) grants jurisdiction to United
States district courts "to enjoin [an] agency from withholding agency
records."' 0 9 In Rizzo v. Tyler"10 the Department of Justice argued that
it was not "withholding agency records" merely by denying a fee
waiver. The district court rejected the argument, stating that "an attempt to condition disclosure upon the payment of fees improperly imposed is the sort of improper withholding that this court may enjoin"
under subsection (a)(4)(B). 1 ' Logically, an attempt to condition disclosure upon the payment of fees is likewise a refusal to comply with a
request for records that gives rise to subsection (a)(6)(A)'s duty to state
reasons for a denial of records.
Given that section 552(a)(6)(A) requires agencies to provide reasons for denying fee waivers, the next question is what satisfies the reasons requirement. Approximately half the appeal decisions the author
examined merely paraphrased the words of the statute's public-benefit
test or listed the criteria considered.t12 But merely repeating the statutory words does not help evolve agency policy through the process of
case-by-case adjudication. Courts dealing with other statutes have typically been unwilling to accept agency explanations that consist of no
't
more than "a bare recitation. . . of the ultimate statutory criteria, 13
or justifications that list a number of criteria the agency considered,
107. Some agencies have taken this view. 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at

93.
108. See note 204 infra and accompanying text.
109. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1976).
110. 438 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
111. Id at 898; Cf National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 554 F.2d 1118, 1122 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (the district court and the Court of Claims have jurisdiction to order refund of fees already
paid). But cf. Eason v. NRC, No. 79-845 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1980) (stating in dictum that even if the
case had not been moot the court would have lacked jurisdiction over the FOIA dispute because

documents were not "withheld" when available for inspection in public documents room).
112. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
113. United States ex rel Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773, 787 (2d Cir. 1972); accord,
Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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without "specific spelling out of the reasons why the balance went
14
against" the party asking for agency action.

Fellner v. Department of JusticeI 5 and Fitzgibbon v. CIA" 6 examined the adequacy of reasons given for fee-waiver denials. In
Fellner the court held inadequate a Department of Justice fee-waiver
denial that claimed to have considered the relevant criteria but that

"[did] not make clear which of these varying standards [had] actually
been applied ....,,17 Fitzgibbon found a fee-waiver denial to be arbitrary and capricious when the agency made no attempt to explain
why furnishing the information would not primarily benefit the pub8
lic."

The choice of a remedy in a case involving inadequate reasons is
an important issue. In Fellner, after finding the Attorney General's

reasons for denying a fee waiver inadequate, the court remanded to the
agency for a second opportunity to provide adequate reasons."

9

In

Fitzgibbon, on the other hand, the court ordered a waiver of fees without giving the agency a second chance to explain its reasons.' 2 0 The

Fitzgibbon approach is preferable. When courts allow after-the-fact
explanations-whether they be post hoc rationalizations of counsel, ' 2 '
post hoc affidavits of agency decision-makers 2 2 (often prepared by
counsel), or post hoc statements after a remand to the agency-they
encourage poor administration in the agency at the time of its initial

and appellate decisions. The cost of further administrative and judicial
proceedings is likely to be many times greater than the cost of simply

waiving the fees. Moreover, remand frustrates the need of many re114. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d at 861 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
115. No. 75-C-430 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 28, 1976).
116. No. 76-700 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1977).
117. No. 75-C-430, slip op. at 8.
118. No. 76-700, slip op. at 1-2.
119. No. 75-C-430, slip op. at 8.
120. No. 76-700, slip op. at 2. The District Court for the District of Columbia does not, however, have a consistent policy. It followed Fitzgibbon in Eudey v. CIA, 478 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C.
1979). But in Roeder v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 79-0216, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. July 5,
1979), and Eason v. NRC, No. 79-845, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1980), the same court (but
different judges) considered explanations that the agencies offered in an affidavit and in interrogatories the plaintiff obtained in discovery even though these reasons were not given in the feewaiver decision itself. See also National Consumers Congress v. Agency for Int'l Dev., No. 751209, slip op. at 17-18 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1976).
121. "[W]e cannot 'accept appellate counsel'spost hoc rationalizations for agency action'; for
an agency's order must be upheld, if at all, 'on the same basis articulated in the order by the
agency itself.'" Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974) (quoting Burlington
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962)); accord, Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (informal rulemaking).
122. See Tabor v. Joint Bd. for Enrollment of Actuaries, 566 F.2d at 709-10 (disapprovaing the
use ofpost hoc affidavits). But see Camps v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); National Foods Ass'n
v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
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A judicial policy of automatic

waiver whenever an agency's decision contains inadequate reasons
would ultimately improve the quality of all fee-waiver decisions,
whether litigated or not. In essence, such a policy would put the burden on the agency to provide adequate reasons for its decision and
would allow the agency to carry its burden only at the time it acts.
B.

Substantive Issues.

The issues raised by agency treatment of fee-waiver requests are
not simply procedural, for the end result of procedures is the creation
of substantive agency policy. The two major substantive issues regarding FOIA fee waivers are what requests should qualify for fee waivers
under the public-benefit test of the statute, and whether public benefit
should be balanced against the cost of producing the documents in determining entitlement to a waiver. Although some agencies have
adopted policies granting waivers or presumptions of waiver either entirely or up to a certain dollar figure for requests from specified groups
or for specific uses, 124 most agencies have no definite policies about
how to rule on requests for fee waivers. Moreover, some agencies have
adopted explicit policies that incorporate into decisions an economic
factor such as balancing the costs to the agency against the benefit to
the public, though most agencies have not stated such a policy publicly. 125 A third issue of some importance is whether agencies may refuse to search for and copy documents on the ground that the
documents are available for public inspection. 2 6 The statute, legislative history, and court decisions all illuminate these issues. We turn
first to the issue of what requests qualify for a waiver under the statute's public-benefit test.
1. The Meaning of the 'PublicBeneft" Test. On its face, the feewaiver provision merely states that agencies should waive fees when
"furnishing the information can be considered as primarily benefiting
the general public."' 2 7 The provision does not specify what benefits the
general public and what does not. It does not indicate whether provid123. Persons seeking documents in order to write articles, publish studies, or participate in
government decision-making often will suffer from the delay inherent in court remands. This may
explain why much fee-waiver case law is made by prisoner cases. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Tyler, 438 F.

Stipp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
124. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
126. The fourth issue, whether agencies may deny fee-waiver requests because of their asserted lack of usefulness to the requester, is discussed in note 170 infra.

127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976).
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ing documents to the press for use in "investigative reporting" benefits
the public, whether nonprofit environmental groups benefit the public
when they use government documents in administrative proceedings to
attempt to change agency policy, whether scholars and authors benefit
the public by illuminating historical events or conducting empirical
studies of government performance, or whether business firms benefit
the general public by obtaining information about competitors' products in the hope of increasing the sales of their own products. The legislative history of the 1974 FOIA Amendments and the cases involving
fee waivers and attorney's fees explain Congress's intent regarding the
answers to these questions.
(a) The 1974 Senate Report. The fee-waiver provision of the
1974 Amendments to the FOIA originated in the Senate bill; 128no such
provision was in the bill that the House passed. The Senate Report 2 9
accordingly provides the best guidance on the meaning of the publicbenefit test. The Senate relied primarily on five sources in passing the
fee-waiver provision: (1) prior law on charging fees for government
services, (2) a 1971 study of the FOIA prepared for the Administrative
Conference, (3) a 1972 House report on the implementation of the
FOIA, (4) existing agency regulations on fee waivers, and (5) discussions of public benefit in the context of attorneys' fees.
(i) Recognition ofpre-1974 law. The FOIA as enacted in 1966
did not include a specific provision for either charging fees or granting
waivers, but instead allowed agencies to charge "fees to the extent authorized by statute."' 30 The Senate Report noted that this phrase was a
reference to the Independent Offices Appropriations Act of 1952
(IOAA) 3 1 and to Circular No. A-25 of the Office of Management and
Budget, first issued in 1959.132 The IOAA allowed each agency to set
fair and equitable charges for government services, requiring the
agency to consider "direct and indirect cost to the Government, value
128. S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), as amended,reprintedin 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 35-41, and 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 187-93.
129. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7,reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 153.
130. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) (amended

1974)).
131. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976). This act has also been called the "user fee statute," and in a
prior codification was designated 5 U.S.C. § 140 (1964).
132. OMB Circular No. A-25 (Sept. 23, 1959), reprintedin Executive Privilege,Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Informationz Hearings on S. 858 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental
Relationsof the Senate Comm. on Government Operationsand Subcomm on SeparationofPowers
andAdministrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Vol. III, 468-70 app. (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings].
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to the recipient [which would lead toward charges], public policy or

interest served [which would lead away from charges], and other pertinent facts."' 33 The Office of Management and Budget issued Circular
No. A-25 to carry out the policies of the IOAA. The transcript of the

1973 Senate hearings reprinted the circular in its entirety, and the
number of the page on which the circular appears in the hearing record
is specifically cited in the 1974 Senate Report. 3 4 The circular drew the
same private-public distinction as the IOAA, stating that a charge
should be imposed when a service "provides special benefits to an iden-

tifiable recipient above and beyond those which accrue to the public at
large. . ..
Examples of "special benefits" cited in the circular included patents, crop insurance, business licenses, airline route awards,
safety inspection of aircraft (because it assists the beneficiary's business
activity), passports, visas, airman's certificates, and special after-hours
",135

business inspections.

36

On the other hand, the circular stated that

charges should be waived in situations in which "the identification of
the ultimate beneficiary is obscure and the service can be primarily
considered as benefiting broadly the general public."' 37 This wording
was the direct antecedent of the fee-waiver provision now found in sec-

tion 552(a)(4)(A) of the FOIA. The circular gave the licensing of new
biological products as one example of a public benefit 38 and listed four
other situations in which fees could be waived: when the cost of collecting the fees would be excessive, when free services would be a courtesy to a foreign country, when the recipient is "engaged in a nonprofit

activity designed for the public safety, health, or welfare," and when
"[p]ayment of the full fee by a State, local government, or nonprofit
group would not be in the interest of the program."' 39
133. Act of Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 376, tit. V, § 501, 65 Stat. 290 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 483a
(1976)). The level or amount of the charges would presumably by based on the "direct and indirect cost to the Government" where value flowed entirely to the recipient; the amount would be
lessened or even waived entirely where a public policy or interest was served or other "pertinent
facts" presented themselves.
134. See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, surpra
note 3, at 162.
135. OMB Circular No. A-25 (Sept. 23, 1959), quoted in 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7,
at 10, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 162. The circular is reprinted in full in
1973 Senate Hearings supra note 132, at 468-70 app.
136. OMB Circular No. A-25, I 3a.(1), revrinted in 1973 Senate Hearings,supra note 132, at
469 app.
137. Id
3a.(2), reprintedin 1973 Senate Hearings supra note 132, at 469 app.
138. Id
139. Id
5b.(1)-(4), reprintedin 1973 Senate Hearings,supra note 132, at 470 app. In Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. United States, 335 F.2d 304, 308-10 (7th Cir. 1964), the court upheld the
IOAA and a Federal Communications Commission regulation interpreting the law to grant waivers of radio license fees to users "on a nonprofit basis essentially for public health, safety and
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(ii) The Administrative Conference study. In adopting the feewaiver provision, the Senate Committee also relied on a 1971 study
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States by
Professor Donald A. Gianella of Villanova University. The Committee
reprinted Gianella's study in a special Source Book prepared for its
members' use in drafting and considering the 1974 Amendments 40 and
relied on the Administrative Conference's recommendations. 14 Gianella discussed the public-interest criterion of the IOAA and Circular
No. A-25 and criticized the Attorney General's Memorandum on the

original FOIA for suggesting that self-sustaining fees be charged for
providing all documents. According to Gianella, although production
of some government documents would fall within the "special benefit"
category, the circular discussed other requests that would "fall more

readily" within the circular's public-benefit category. 142 As examples
of the latter, he asserted that "records provided to a newspaper reporter
or an author concerning a matter of wide interest ultimately benefit the
general public."' 143 Gianella would have preferred a fee and fee-waiver
policy based on the expected use of documents. 144 Finding, however,

that uniform application of a policy based on use would probably be
unworkable, he recommended that waivers be provided to certain cate-

gories of requesters, such as those "engaged in nonprofit activities for
the public safety, health and welfare," one of the categories mentioned
45
in Circular No. A-25.1

welfare." The Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the IOAA as prohibiting charges for services that serve "public policy" or the "public interest," laying to rest the notion that the statute's
instruction not to charge fees was precatory rather than mandatory. National Cable Television
Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-42 (1974). A subsequent case has indicated that the
preparation of environmental impact statements can be a government action that primarily benefits the general public within the meaning of the IOAA, at least when the statement is not done for
the benefit of a single private applicant. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. NRC, 601 F.2d 223,
231 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979); cf Public Serv. Co. v. Andrus, 433 F. Supp. 144 (D. Colo. 1977) (environmental impact statements can be considered as primarily benefiting the public). One might speculate that the same rationale would justify waivers for documents to be used by members of the
public in the preparation of an environmental impact statement.
140. See Gianella, supra note 5, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 296.
141. See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 163.
142. Gianella, supra note 5, at 259, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 338.
143. Id Some agencies have suggested in fee-waiver appeal decisions that the news media
might fall on the private-benefit side of the line because they are operated for profit. OMB Circular No. A-25 itself included at least one profit-making enterprise (making new biological products)
as an activity that confers a public benefit, however, and the explicit references in the 1974 history
to the news media, see text accompanying notes 151, 158-59 infra, make clear that a commercial
news organization does qualify for a waiver if it is engaged in news-gathering.
144. Gianella, supra note 5, at 259, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 338.
145. Id 259-60, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 338-39.
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(iii) Testimony before Congress. The third source to which the
1974 Senate Report referred was testimony in both houses of Congress.
In 1972 the House Committee on Government Operations concluded a
long investigation into the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act. In its report the committee recommended that federal agencies include in their regulations provisions for waiver of fees when
waiver would serve the public interest. 146 The problems reported in the
1972 House Report became part of the Senate Committee's grounds for
proposing legislative amendments to the FOIA in 1974. The 1974 Senate Report cited the earlier House Report repeatedly, 47 and the 1975
Report as part of the legislative
Source Book later reprinted the House
48
history of the 1974 Amendments.
The 1972 House Report rang with indignation as it discussed the
problems that search and copying fees had presented to a nonprofit
group working on a study of air safety, a university researcher investigating pesticides, a lawyer from a nonprofit group interested in pesticide regulation, and a nonprofit transportation institute researching a
public subsidies program run by the Maritime Administration. 49 The
1974 Senate Report quoted the House Report's conclusion "that search
fees and copying charges may be used by an agency to effectively deny
public access to agency records,"' 50 making it reasonable to conclude
that the Senate Committee, in citing the House Report, had in mind the
House testimony by people engaged in nonprofit, public-interest activities and scholarly or research projects when it recommended fee waivers for FOIA requests in the "public benefit." The 1974 Senate Report
also discussed testimony given before the Senate Committee in 1973 on
fee problems encountered by a newspaper reporter and two lawyers for
a nonprofit group,' 5 ' thus adding journalism to the kinds of publicbenefit activities contemplated by the 1974 FOIA amendments.
(iv) Existing regulations. More evidence of the Senate Committee's intent is its statement that the public-benefit test for fee waivers is
"borrowed from regulations in effect at the Departments of Transporta146. 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 82, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3,

at 89.
147. See, e.g., 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra
note 3, at 155-56.
148. See 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 1.
149. 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 58-59, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note
3, at 65-66.
150. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BoOK,,supra note 3,
at 163 (quoting 1972 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 57).
151. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at
156.
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tion and Justice."152 Indeed, the public-benefit language in the Senate
bill is identical in all relevant respects to the language of the Department of Transportation's regulation. That regulation explains what is
meant by the phrase "primarily benefiting the general public": "Examples ... [include] reasonable requests from groups engaged in a nonprofit activity designed for the public safety, health, or welfare; schools;
and students engaged in study in the field of transportation."'' 5 3 Again,
this supports the conclusion that nonprofit activities and educational or
scholarly work were among the types of requests the Senate had in
mind when it drafted the public-benefit test.
(v) The attorneys'-fees discussion. The final and most explicit
source of information about the Senate's intent is that the Senate bill,
adding a new section 552(a)(4)(E) to deal with attorneys' fees, used the
same public-benefit test that is in the fee-waiver provision. 5 4 The proposed section listed four criteria for a court to consider in deciding
whether to grant attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a FOIA case:
(1) benefit to the public; (2) "'commercial benefit to the complainant';
(3) 'the nature of the complainant's 'interest in the records sought'; and
(4) 'whether the government's withholding of the records sought had a
reasonable basis in law.' ,,'5s The Senate Report's discussion of the first
three criteria sheds light on the types of activities the committee
thought were within the public-benefit category. The first criterion
would justify the award of fees "for example, where a newsman was
seeking information to be used in a publication or a public interest
group was seeking information to further a project benefitting the general public, but [not when a business sought] data relating to a competitor or as a substitute for discovery" in litigation against the
government.' 5 6 The commercial-benefit criterion would justify the re152. Id. 12, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 164.
153. 49 C.F.R. § 7.87(c) (1974). The Justice Department regulations contained only the public-benefit language and no specific examples. 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(a) (1974). They speak of waiving
fees for indigents, but not necessarily as part of the public-benefit test.
154. The proposed section 552(a)(4)(E) reads as follows:
The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees. . . . In exercising its discretion under this paragraph, the court shall consider the benefit to thepublic,
if any,. . . the commercial benefit to the complainant and the nature of his interest in
the records sought, and whether the government's withholding of the records sought had
a reasonable basis in law.
1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 37-38, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at
189-90 (emphasis added).
155. Id 19, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 171 (quoting S.2543, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974)).
156. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3,
at 171.
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covery of fees by an indigent or "a nonprofit public interest group," but
not by "a large corporate interest (or a representative of such an interest)."' 157 The discussion of the third criterion stated that the court
would generally award fees if the complainant's interests were "scholarly or journalistic or public-interest oriented," but not frivolous or
purely commercial. 58 The report thus highlights journalists, scholars,
nonprofit public-interest groups, and indigents as generally being entitled to attorneys' fees, and disapproves of attorneys' fees being awarded
when documents are sought for commercial purposes. t59
The rationale the report gave for distinguishing between requests
that would receive assistance and requests by commercial interests was
that, even without attorneys' fees, "[t]he private self-interest motive of,
and often pecuniary benefit to, the complainant will be sufficient to
insure the vindication of the rights given in the FOIA." 60 This rationale applies equally to fee waivers. If public-benefit attorneys' fees were
meant to give certain requesters an incentive to litigate their rights
under the FOIA, public-benefit fee waivers were probably meant to
give these same requesters an incentive to exercise their rights to obtain
documents under the FOIA. By the same token, the intent to exclude
commercial interests from satisfying the public-benefit test should apply to fee waivers as well as attorneys' fees.
(b) The Conference Report. Another source indicating legislative
intent is the report of the Senate-House Conference Committee on the
1974 Amendments. 16' The original Senate bill162 allowed agencies to

157. Id
158. Id
159. The report specifically provided that news interests should not be considered commercial
interests. Id See note 143 supra. The category of indigents is mentioned only in the discussion of
the second criterion of the Senate's attorneys'-fees provision, the "commercial benefit" criterion,
and the category of scholars is mentioned only in the discussion of the third criterion, the "nature"
of the complainant's interest in information. If indigents and scholars would be eligible only
under such criteria and not under the separate public-benefit criterion, one might argue that they
could not use the fee-waiver provision because it contains only the "public benefit" language.
This conclusion would be erroneous. The discussion of the public-benefit criterion is the one time
the Senate Report uses the broad phrase "for example" before identifying newsmen and public
interest groups as eligible. Other examples must also exist. Neither indigents nor scholars are
akin to "commercial interests," the primary category of ineligible requesters. Apparently the
Committee staff found it convenient for stylistic reasons to vary its examples from one paragraph
to the next, while actually intending these basic groups-identified clearly in other parts of the
legislative-history-to be eligible for the public-benefit waiver.
160. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3,
at 171.
161. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3.
162. S.2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), as amended,reprintedin 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 7, at 35-41, and 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 188. The House bill included no fee-
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waive fees when the public-benefit test was satisfied and required agencies to waive fees for requests by indigents, requests for documents not
found or found to be exempt, and requests in which the fee would be
less than three dollars. The Conference Committee eliminated the
mandatory waiver for the specific categories but changed the language
of the public-benefit waiver to provide that agencies "shall" (rather
than "may") waive fees when the test is satisfied. Addressing these
changes, the Conference Report stated:
[T]he conference substitute retains the agency's discretionary publicinterest waiver authority but eliminates the specific categories of situations where fees should not be charged.
By eliminating the list of specific categories, the conferees do not
intend to imply that agencies should actually charge fees in those
categories. Rather, they felt, such matters are properly the subject
in regulations implementing the
for individual agency determination
63
Freedom of Information law.'
That the report speaks of retaining discretionary public-interest
waiver authority is puzzling, because the Conference Committee
changed the key language from the discretionary "may" to the
mandatory "shall."' 164 Although "discretionary" could refer to the decision whether to grant a waiver-the interpretation in the Attorney
General's Memorandumt 65 -it could also refer to allowing each
agency to refine the public-benefit test into eligibility categories most
suited for its particular mission. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency might focus on environmental groups, while the Commission on Civil Rights might make special provision for civil rights
groups. In theory, however, the Attorney General's expansive view of
the adjective "discretionary" would allow an agency to waive fees for
all oil companies but charge fees for all nonprofit groups or the news
media. There is nothing in the Conference Report suggesting that the
conference intended to cast the public-benefit test adrift from the history already written in the House and Senate from 1972-1974, in which
the test was consistently associated with requests from nonprofit groups
waiver provision. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 8,reprinted in 1975 SOURCE
BOOK, supra note 3, at 225.
163. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 8, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 225.
164. Compare 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 36, reprinted in 1975 SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 3, at 188, with 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 2, reprintedin 1975
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 220.
165. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S 1975 MEMORANDUM, supra note 42, at 16, reprinted in 1975
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 526.
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trying to affect government policy, from journalists, and from scholars.166
(c) Court decisions. The few fee-waiver cases decided since the
enactment of the 1974 amendments provide some guidance in determining the content of the public-benefit test. Cases dealing with the
award of attorneys' fees in FOIA cases are also helpful.
Much fee-waiver litigation involves prison inmates seeking documents relevant either to their incarceration or to their defense against
pending criminal charges. The courts have almost uniformly held that
such documents were sought for the private benefit of the inmates
rather than primarily for the public's benefit.' 67
Eudey v. CI4 68 is a good example of a case in which the requester
satisfied the public-benefit test. In that case, the district court awarded
a waiver of fees to a historian for documents to be used in her planned
study on Italian and French trade unions. The Government had conceded that her study might be of public interest but asserted that most
of the requested documents were exempt from disclosure.169 The court
replied that even a single document, or the knowledge of "the absence
of documents" in agency files, could "benefit the public by shedding
light on the subject of plaintiffs research."170 The court stated that the
"central issue" is whether benefit will inure primarily to the "public at
large" or to the "specific individual requesting the documents.' 171
Proper factors to consider in shedding light on that issue are the "identity of the requester" and the "nature of the information sought.' 72
166. See text accompanying notes 130-60 supra.
167. See Jester v. Department of Justice, No. 79-1347 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1979); Lyles v. Department of Justice, No. 78-1826 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979); Armstrong v. FBI, No. 78-1774 (D.D.C. Apr.
27, 1979); Butler v. IRS, No. C78-1582A (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 1979); Rizzo v. Tyler, 438 F. Supp.
895, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Burke v. Department of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1976) (no
discussion of eligibility; decision based on agency discretion), ajy'd, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1977);
Fackelman v. Levi, 564 F.2d 734 (N.D. Ga. 1976). For a reference to an unpublished district court
opinion awarding a waiver of fees, see Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 531 (5th Cir.
1978).
168. 478 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1979).
169. Id at 1176.
170. Id The Eudey court's analysis is also relevant to the few agency appeal decisions that
have denied fee waivers on the ground that the documents likely to be provided would not be
useful to the requester. See Table B in text accompanying note 41 supra. The court reasoned that
the FOIA "does not permit a consideration of how many documents will ultimately be released"
and that "a single document may ... substantially enrich the public domain." 478 F. Supp. at
1177. See note 218 infra and accompanying text. This analysis leads directly to the conclusion
that the statute does not permit the agency to consider how many useful facts will be made available, as long as there is the possibility that some will be. Indeed, even the revelation of the lack of
relevant facts may be useful.
171. 478 F. Supp. at 1176.
172. Id
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The court contrasted the public benefit provided by Eudey's research
with the private benefit in Rizzo v. Tyler,173 in which a fee waiver was
denied a prison inmate seeking documents to assist in his defense
against pending criminal charges. Encapsulating the distinction, the
court stated: "Although many cases will not be as clear as Rizzo, the
identity of the requester and whether his purpose for seeking the information is academic, journalistic, commercial or of some other public or
private nature and the character of the information itself can guide the
agency's determination."' 174 At least one government agency, the Department of the Interior, has read Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 75 a case similar to
Eudey, as establishing the rule that a public-interest group such as a
wilderness or conservation organization can generally make "aprima
facie case for waiver by showing that it is a nonprofit organization and
that it intends to use requested documents for purposes other than its
own 'immediate financial benefit.' "176
In Zybarger v. Cardwell' 7 7 the representatives of a nonprofit organization that helped persons receive Supplemental Security Income
benefits had asked the regional Social Security office for a variety of
government materials and handbooks to help the organization fulfill its
duties. The organization brought suit when its request for a full waiver
was denied. The issue before the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
was the extent of, rather than the entitlement to, the waiver. 7 8 In affirming the agency's award of only a partial waiver, the court noted
173. 438 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
174. 478 F. Supp. at 1177. The District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a fee
waiver based on the requester's academic purpose in Fitzgibbon v. CIA, No. 76-700 (D.D.C. Jan.
10, 1977), reprintedin 1977 Senate Hearings, ipra note 8, at 822, reprintedinpartin 1980 SENATE
SUBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 94 n.91. In Roeder v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 79-0216
(D.D.C. July 5, 1979), however, the same court denied, without issuing an opinion, a fee waiver to
a journalist.
175. No. 76-700 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1977), reprintedin 1977 Senate Hearings,supra note 8, at 822.
See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
176. Memorandum from Associate Solicitor of the Department of Interior to Regional Solicitor-Portland (Aug. 21, 1979) (on file with the author). The memorandum suggested that an
example of "financial benefit" to a nonprofit group might be the solicitation of new readers or
members by obtaining government personnel lists. Although a court would probably agree with
the Department of Interior's line-drawing, even a solicitation of new members by a nonprofit
group could be considered in the public interest. The purpose of soliciting new members for a
nonprofit group differs from the purpose of a commercial enterprise seeking a list solely for private, profit-making solicitation. Cf. Disabled Officers Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 458-59
(D.D.C. 1977) (holding under the privacy exemption of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976),
that in weighing the balance between the public interest in disclosure and an individual's interest
in privacy, providing a list of names to a nonprofit group could be in the public interest as distinguished from providing a list "solely for purposes of private commercial solicitations").
177. 577 F.2d 764 (Ist Cir. 1978).
178. The government had previously agreed to reduce fees by 75%, but the plaintiff sought a
waiver of all fees.
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that the FOIA vests considerable discretion in the agency in charging

fees. The court also stated, however, that "it is clear that plaintiffs'
request is for the good of the general public .... ,"179
The description of public and private benefit in Eudey and
Lybarger matches the legislative history's discussion of the public-ben-

efit test. 180 The Eudey court's examples, quoted above,' 8 ' include two
of the three basic eligible categories revealed in the legislative history-

academic and journalistic purposes. The examples also include the one
basic ineligible category-commercial purpose. Lybarger provides an

example of the third major eligible category-nonprofit groups. 82
Because the same public-benefit test arises in the FOIA attorneys'fees provision,18 3 cases interpreting that provision give further guidance

on the meaning of "public benefit." The attorneys'-fees cases empha-

size the same distinction between scholars, journalists, and nonprofit
groups on the one hand, and commercial and purely individual interests on the other. In Lovell v. Aderete,18 4 for example, the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a prisoner's motion for attorneys'
fees after FOIA litigation. The court observed that the prisoner's
FOIA request for his eyeglass prescription was "not 'scholarly or journalistic or public-interest oriented,' 1815 and, though it was not commercial, neither would it benefit the public, because it would "in no
way add to the fund of knowledge citizens use when making vital political choices."' 186 The request for the eyeglass prescription was strictly a
"private matter."' 187 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit had earlier drawn the same distinction between public and pri179. 577 F.2d at 766.
180. See notes 128-66 supra and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the opinions have not
delved into the legislative history. Had they done so, they would be more likely to influence
agency behavior.
181. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 130-60 supra.
183. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
184. 630 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1980).
185. Id at 433 (quoting Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 712
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
186. 630 F.2d at 432 (citing Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1978)).
187. 630 F.2d at 432. The court also applied the same tests to two other FOIA requests by the
prisoner, for his parole recommendation file and for an investigative report on the Atlanta prison.
It found that the latter request "would appear to have some public benefit," but that providing the
investigative report to a prisoner would not likely lead to either public dissemination or a public
impact. Id at 433. But see Marschner v. Department of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D. Conn.
1979) (attorneys' fees awarded to prisoner in successful FOIA lawsuit to obtain documents for use
in own habeas corpus proceeding because the "public has an interest in the proper administration
ofjustice in this country, and to that extent has benefited from the disclosure in this case"); Jones
v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700 (D.D.C. 1979) (attorneys' fees awarded to prisoner
because of the public interest in keeping avenues of relief open).
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vate benefit after carefully reviewing the legislative history of the attor-

neys'-fees provision of the FOIA and surveying many of the decided
cases under the provision. 8 8 Indeed, the decided cases consistently put
requests from scholars, journalists, and nonprofit groups on the publicbenefit side of the line.
In Goldstein v. Levi' 89 the District Court for the District of Columbia awarded attorneys' fees under the public-benefit test to a television
producer who sought documents to use in a book and public television
documentary rather than for his personal commercial benefit. 190 Similarly, in Consumers Union of the UnitedStates, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the FederalReserve System, 9l the same court used the public-

benefit test to award attorneys' fees to a nonprofit consumer group that
obtained interest-rate information for various types of consumer in-

stallment loans.' 92 Attorneys' fees have been denied, as not meeting
the public-benefit test, a plaintiff who sought her Federal Bureau of
93

an agricultural group

purposes, 194

a taxpayer who sought

Investigation file for her personal interests,
that sought records for commercial

Internal Revenue Service records during a fraud investigation,

95

a

dispute, 196
97

and a person
business involved in defending itself in a labor
corporation.'
a
with
dispute
commercial
a
in
involved
In summary, the fee-waiver and attorneys'-fees cases have recognized news reporting, scholarship or authorship, and activities by non-

profit organizations to be of primary benefit to the general public, while
denominating as nonpublic the use of documents for commercial or
wholly personal purposes.' 98 Because there has been more develop188. See Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 710-13 (D.C. Cir.
1977). See also Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
189. 415 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1976).
190. Id at 304-05; accord,Miami Herald v. Small Business Admnistration, 6 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1686 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (news media granted attorneys' fees).
191. 410 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1975).
192. Id at 64 (over $19,500 awarded).
193. Friedman v. Kelly, No. 75-965 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 1976), discussedin Goldstein v. Levi, 415
F. Supp. 303, 304 n.4 (D.D.C. 1976). But Sf Exner v. FBI, 443 F. Supp. 1349, 1353-54 (S.D. Cal.
1978) (the court awarded attorneys' fees when the request, which was made for personal reasons,
produced a public-benefit side effect), afl'd, 612 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).
194. Orange County Vegetable Improvement Coop. Ass'n v. Department of Agriculture, No.
75-842 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 1976), cited in Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F. Supp. at 304 n.4.
195. Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979); see

Pope v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
196. Polynesian Cultural Center v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1979) (obtaining
documents in a labor dispute is a "wholly commercial" interest, not a public benefit); accord,
Werner-Continental, Inc. v. Farkas, 478 F. Supp. 815, 817 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
197. Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
198. An agency may undoubtedly deny a "frivolous" claim of public benefit. Rizzo v. Tyler,
438 F. Supp. 895, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But cf. 1972 HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 54-55,
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ment of this distinction in the attomeys'-fees cases, the law of fee waivers would progress greatly if agencies and courts would apply the
attorneys'-fees cases to resolving issues of public benefit in fee-waiver
requests and litigation, rather than acting as if the substantive meaning
of the public-benefit test for fee waivers was unclear or was a matter for
each agency to decide without congressional guidance.
2. The Issue of Cost. One of the major issues involving fee waivers is whether, in deciding whether to waive fees, an agency may balance the public benefit against the cost of providing the information. A
few agency regulations explicitly state that costs may be considered 99
and a number of agency appeal decisions have stated that costs played
a role in the decision.2° The 1980 Senate Subcommittee Report, how201
ever, criticized the practice of considering costs.
The agency regulations and appeal decisions that have relied on a
cost-benefit analysis have not identified the legal grounds for their position. They probably rely either on the general notion that the FOIA's
fee-waiver authority is "discretionary" or on the fact that the statute
provides for agencies to give a waiver "or reduction" of fees.202 The
reference in the Conference Report to agencies' "discretionary" feewaiver authority, and the apparent conflict between that phrase and the
change from the Senate bill's provision that agencies "may" waive fees
to the Conference's bill's provision that agencies "shall" waive fees,
have been previously analyzed.20 3 The question remains whether the
statutory provision for a reduction of fees, as opposed to a complete
waiver, was intended to allow costs to be considered. The regulations
and appeal decisions that allow the balancing of cost and benefit actually use cost as the basis for denying both waivers and reductions, not
merely to give reductions in lieu of waivers. But even if costs were used
only to decide how much of a reduction or waiver to give, a problem
arises in that no legislative history supports that interpretation of the
"or reduction" phrase.
replrintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 61-62 (the use of fees to discourage "frivolous"

requests is improper). In light of the legislative history, however, an agency must overcome a
strong presumption of public benefit, before it can deny a waiver, if the request for the waiver

comes from a reporter, scholar, or nonprofit organization. Such a request must be completely
without public benefit to be designated frivolous. See text accompanying note 158 supra. In light
of the legislative history, careful court scrutiny is necessary to ensure that agencies do not deny, as
frivolous, valid requests from one of these requesters.
199. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
200. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
201. See 1980 SENATE SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 78-79.

202. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976).
203. See text accompanying notes 164-66 supra.
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Nothing in the 1974 Senate Report or in any other part of the leg-

islative history of the 1974 amendments demonstrates any concern with
the cost to the government of fee waivers. On the contrary, the legisla-

tors expressed concern about the costs to requesters of fees, citing cases
of a public-interest attorney who was told to pay $91,000 for documents 204 and of another attorney who was told to pay $20,000 for a
preliminary search.2 0 5 Furthermore, the Senate Committee made clear
its intent that, despite the Independent Offices Appropriations Act's no-

tion that government services "shall be self-sustaining to the full extent
possible," 20 6 under the new amendments "with the provisions for
waiver and reduction of fees, it is not necessary that FOIA services
performed by agencies be self-sustaining. '20 7 Similarly, when the rep-

resentatives from the House and Senate met to draw up a compromise
bill, their Conference report said nothing about a possible lack of selfrestraint by requesters or about costs to the agencies. Instead, it stated:
"The conferees intend that fees should not be used for the purpose of

discouraging requests for information or as obstacles to disclosure of
requested information. '20 A fee that is an obstacle to the disclosure of
requested information does not become less of an obstacle simply be-

cause the reason for imposing it is the cost to the government of providing the documents. There is no evidence from the legislative history
that cost to the government was considered a valid basis on which to
20 9
make waiver or reduction decisions.
204. After the House conferees accepted the Senate's proposal for public-interest fee waivers,
one of the House conferees, Congressman Alexander, recounted in a floor statement the testimony
given at the hearings regarding the experience of a public-interest lawyer seeking pesticide registration information from the Department of Agriculture. After pointing out that the Department
refused to release the information without payment of nearly $92,000 for a prospective one-andone-half year search, Congressman Alexander expressed concern not about the cost to the government, but about the potential cost to the requester:
I shudder to think of the amount of time, energy, and money wasted in this process.
The enactment of these amendments to the Freedom of Information Act will put an
end to the ridiculous delays, excuses, and bureaucratic runarounds which have denied
U.S. citizens their "right to know" and made Americans a captive of their own Government.
120 CONG. REC. 34,166 (1974), reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3, at 387-88.
205. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3,
at 163.
206. 31 U.S.C. § 483a (1976).
207. 1974 SENATE REPORT, upra note 7, at 11-12,reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note
3, at 163-64.
208. 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra
note 3, at 225. For a case relying on this language, see Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 367 (9th Cir.
1979) (great expense in editing documents does not justify nondisclosure), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
917 (1980).
209. An alternative to the cost interpretation of the "or reduction" phrase is that agencies can
give reductions even to commercial requesters if the primary benefit from the use of certain docu-
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A number of fee-waiver cases have obliquely discussed the issue of
cost. In NationalConsumers Congress v. Agencyjor InternationalDevel-

opment 21° the requesters, two nonprofit consumer organizations and an
individual consumer advocate, had sought documents in order to un-

cover possible corruption in the rice export program. 211 The agency

denied their waiver request because of the magnitude of the search fees
that would be required to retrieve the documents and because the doc-

212
uments, when located, might not reveal any evidence of corruption.
The consumer groups apparently did not argue in court that the costs

were irrelevant; the plaintiffs asserted instead that the costs would be
small. 2 13 The District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the
'2 14
denial, referring to the plaintiffs' request as "sweeping.
Three years after National Consumers Congress, the same court
ments will accrue to the general public, while complete waivers are reserved for journalistic, schol-

arly, and nonprofit purposes. The support for this interpretation is that under the IOAA the fee
charged for a government service (the amount of reduction from actual cost of the service) was
based on factors including "public policy or interest" and "value to the recipient." 31 U.S.C.
§ 483a (1976). In other words, partial public benefit might lead to partial reduction. A complete
exemption from fees was allowed for nonprofit activities. But commercial interests (such as companies licensing new biological products) could get such partial reductions. See text accompanying notes 130-39 supra. The same spectrum may have been contemplated in 1974 by the drafters
of section 552(a)(4)(A), with nonprofit groups, scholars, and journalists placed at the total-waiver
end of the spectrum, with most commercial interests at the other end, and perhaps with indigents
and some commercial interests in the middle. The Department of Justice now appears to agree
with this view. See OILP's 1980 MEMORANDUM, supra note 59, at 20. The Lybarger decision did
not come to this conclusion, but the court did not discuss the apparent background of the "reduction" provision in the IOAA. 577 F.2d 764 (1st Cir. 1978). See also text accompanying note 178
supra.

Though it may be difficult to believe that Congress would establish a program leaving no
authority for the government to base its decisions on cost, other such programs have been established. For example, the Supreme Court concluded in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246
(1976), that Congress in the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments did not authorize the Environmental Protection Agency to consider technical or economic feasibility in deciding whether to approve
state implementation plans, which were designed to meet national ambient air quality standards.
See also Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology-Forcing" in the Clean Air Act, ENvIR. REP.
(BNA), Monograph No. 21 (1975) at 11-12.
210. No. 75-1209 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1976).
211. Id, slip op. at 6.
212. Id, slip op. at 18-19.
213. Id, slip op. at 19.
214. Id., slip op. at 20. NationalConsumers Congress can be read, however, as upholding the
agency solely because there was no showing of public benefit rather than because of expense to the
agency. In Lybarger v. Cardwell, 577 F.2d 764, 766 (1st Cir. 1978), the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stated that the FOIA, on its face, appears to vest full discretion with an agency
concerning the amount of waiver or reduction to offer a requester. This could be read as allowing
an agency to use any reason it wishes-including the expense of a complete waiver-for granting
only a partial waiver for a public-benefit request. The court did not, however, discuss the propriety of considering the expense to the agency in deciding on an amount of reduction.
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took an opposite position in Eudey v. CIA.215 In that case the Central
Intelligence Agency conceded that a historian's research was of public
interest but denied the waiver because the search would be likely to
produce little, if any, non-exempt information and would therefore be
of slight benefit to the public.2 16 The court overturned the denial, stat-

ing that it was "based on a factor that is not controlling under the terms
of the statute." 217 The court explained: "The statute does not permit a
consideration of how many documents will ultimately be released. The
court notes, moreover, that a single document may, in the present context, substantially enrich the public domain." 21 8 In sum, the court held
that if research is "of public interest and is significant," a decision not
to grant a waiver or reduction of fees is "arbitrary and capricious. ' '219
Fitzgibbon v. CIA displays a similar rationale. The court criticized an
agency's statement that it felt an obligation to the public to collect fees
for processing FOIA requests. The court held that "[a]ny such per' '220
ceived obligation is irrelevant to the purposes of § 552(a)(4)(A).
The most thoughtful analysis of the role of costs in decisions under
the FOIA is the opinion in Long v. IRS. 22 1 The case provides additional support for the position that the expense of processing FOIA
requests is not a proper basis for denying documents to the public. In
Long a private requester was willing to pay normal search and copying
fees, but the government denied his FOIA request on the ground that
the total cost to the government would be unreasonably high even after
collecting the fees.222 The government claimed it would cost $160,000

to edit and reproduce the requested information. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial. The court said it believed
that the actual unreimbursed cost to the Internal Revenue Service
would be less, but sought to "put this matter in perspective" by discussing "how costly the FOIA can be generally for agencies. ' 223 The court
215. 478 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1979). The Eudey court did not mention National Consumers
Congress in its opinion.
216. Id at 1176-77.
217. Id at 1177.
218. Id The court even suggested that knowledge of "the absence of documents. .. may
itself benefit the public by shedding light on the subject of Plaintiffs research." Id If this reasoning had been applied to the request of the consumer groups in National Consumers Congress, that
case would have been decided the other way.
219. Id
220. No. 76-700, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1977), reprintedin 1977 Senate Hearings,supra

note 8,at 822.
221. 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980).
222. Certain costs, such as editing documents to delete withholdable portions, are not direct
costs under section 552(a)(4)(A), and thus cannot be charged to requesters under section
552(a)(4)(A). 596 F.2d at 366-67.
223. Id at 367.
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noted that the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that its 1977
cost of complying with the FOIA was over $2.5 million, that one FOIA
request required the Department of Justice to assign 65 full-time and
21 part-time employees to process the request after a court ordered disclosure, and that despite such high expenses "Congress has not limited
224
access under the Act."
Long is a particularly important case because it rejects the notion
(at least for a request costing well over $100,000 and requiring the efforts of several dozen employees) that a court or an agency has inherent
authority to read a reasonable cost limitation into the Act's disclosure
requirement. The court examined the legislative history and found in
the Conference Report a legislative intent that agencies must absorb
"substantial" costs. The court based its conclusion about legislative intent on the statement in a paragraph concerning fee waivers that asserts
"that fees should not be used for the purpose of discouraging requests
for information or as obstacles to disclosure of requested information. ' 225 If this sentence shows Congress's intent as to the costs involved in Long, it necessarily shows Congress's intent as to costs
involved in fee waivers. Accordingly, costs of several thousand dollars
are not a proper basis for denying a fee waiver.
Another perspective outside the fee-waiver issue is the role of government costs in the award of attorneys' fees. The legislative history
demonstrates that fee-waiver and attorneys'-fees awards are based on
the same public-benefit test. 226 The FOIA states that agencies "shall"
grant fee waivers or reductions and that courts "may" award reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with FOIA requests. 227 Costs to the
government are not a limiting factor in attorneys'-fee awards. The authority to award only "reasonable" attorneys' fees involves a consideration of the skill and efficiency with which the attorney conducts the
case, not a consideration of the overall impact on the government's
budget. 228 Viewing the two formulations side-by-side, one must con224. Id The court indicated that a case might arise in which costs were so extreme that the
request would have to be dismissed as unreasonable, but concluded that it could not find that in
the case before it "the costs of editing are so extreme" as to make the request "unreasonable as a
matter of law." Id
225. Id (citing 1974 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7, reprinted in 1975 SouRcE
BOOK, supra note 3, at 225). The full paragraph is set forth at note 78 supra.
226. See text accompanying notes 154-60 supra.
227. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976) with id. § 552(a)(4)(E).

228. A panel decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which
expressed concern over the incentive that the government's "deep pocket" gives to potential litigants, tried to adopt a formula that would yield lower attorneys'-fees awards. Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The panel decision was overturned in an en banc
rehearing. 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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elude that if costs to the government play no\ role in attorneys'-fees
cases, those costs can play no role in fee-waiver decisions either. 22 9
In summary, the legislative history contemplates that the government may have to bear extraordinarily high costs for all FOIA requests, including those in which a fee waiver is an element of the costs,
and that Congress was much more concerned with the impact of search
and duplication costs on public-benefit requesters than with the impact
of the costs on the government agencies. Thus, the 1980 Senate Subcommittee was correct in stating that the FOIA does not permit agencies to make cost to the government a criterion by which fee-waiver or
fee-reduction decisions may be made.
3. SubstitutingInspectionfor Search and Copying. The final issue

of substantive law that has arisen in the fee-waiver regulations and
case-by-case decisions is whether an agency may refuse to grant a
waiver solely on the ground that the requester may inspect the documents in a public reading room maintained by the agency. Agencies
have used such inspection, as a substitute for the normal process of
finding requested documents and mailing them to the requester, to
deny fee waivers not only to requesters located in the same city in
which the documents are, but also to requesters on the other side of the
continent. For example, a request the author made from Oregon for
the fee-waiver appeal decisions of the Department of Justice, which
included a request for fee waiver for providing such documents, was
refused because the documents were available for inspection in Washington, D.C.230
Refusals to grant fee waivers when documents are available for
inspection can involve both a refusal to search for the specific documents requested and a refusal to provide copies of documents, unless
the requester is willing and able to pay normal search and copying fees.
It is not clear what legal arguments might be marshalled in favor of
such practices.
229. One may argue that the reason for ignoring expense to the government in attorneys'-fees
awards is that such awards are made when the government is in some sense culpable, a factor not
present in the award of fee waivers. The FOIA provides for attorneys' fees whenever a publicbenefit requester substantially prevails in court, however, with no requirement that the government acted in bad faith or unreasonably. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19-20, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BooK, supra note 3, at 171-72. The reason
for ignoring expense to the government is the same for both attorneys' fees and fee waivers,
namely that each program exists to provide an incentive to public-benefit requesters.
230. Letter from Office of Privacy and Information Appeals, Department of Justice, to author
(June 24, 1980).
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An agency that places file cabinets of documents in a public read-

ing room and leaves it to the requester to find the specific documents he
wants essentially has no program for searching for documents as contemplated by section 552(a)(4)(A).231 An agency that refuses to conduct searches in its public reading room and thus requires out-of-city
requesters to spend additional money may violate section

552(a)(4)(A)'s requirements of "uniform," "reasonable," and "standard" charges for a document "search."
An agency that refuses to copy documents without charge for a
person otherwise eligible for a fee waiver, simply because the 'documents may be inspected, 232 violates the duplication duty imposed by
233

section 552(a)(4)(A).
Moreover, the fee-waiver provision of section 552(a)(4)(A) states
that an agency will "furnish" requested documents. Congress used the
word "furnish" in the fee-waiver provision of the FOIA instead of
words implying a mere right of inspection, even though it used words
denoting inspection elsewhere in the statute for other purposes. 234 The
legislative history of the original FOIA also recognized the distinction

between inspection and copying. The bill introduced in the Senate in
1964 provided only for inspection, but was changed by the Senate
Committee to add a provision for copying:
the phrase "* * * and copying * * *" was added because it is frequently of little use to be able to inspect orders or the like unless one
is able to copy them for future reference. Hence the right to copy
231. "Such fees shall be limited to the reasonable standard charges for document search and
duplication and provide for recovery of only the direct costs of such search and duplication." 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976) (emphasis added). Though such a position might be defensible as

applied to persons in the same city if the file cabinets are adequately indexed under section
552(a)(2), which provides for public inspection of some documents, a requester living elsewhere in
the nation-whether he seeks documents for private use or for public benefit--can be required to
spend more on transportation to get to the documents (perhaps several hundred dollars) than
would be the fee if the agency continued to have a search program.
232. See, eg., 10 C.F.R. § 9.14a(g) (1980) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). The regulation
states that "[tihe NRC will not waive the reproduction costs for documents located or made available in the NRC Public Document Room or a local public document room in the absence of a
compelling reason to do so." The preamble to the regulation states that eligibility for a fee waiver
itself is not a "compelling reason." 44 Fed. Reg. 16,000 (1979).
233. That this section speaks of duplicating indicates a duty to duplicate.
234. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated recently in a non-fee-waiver case,
Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. United States Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382
(2d Cir. 1978): "The statute treats various types of agency information in different ways. Some
must be published in the Federal Register [section 552(a)(1)]; some must be made available for
public inspection and copying [section 552(a)(2)]; and other reasonably described records are obtainable on request to an agency [section 552(a)(3)]." Id at 1384. Subsection (a)(4)(A)'s waiver
provision applies to both (a)(2) and (a)(3) records, because subsection (a)(4)(A) applies by its
terms to all of "the provisions of this section"-that is, to the entire FOIA.
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to the right to inspect and makes the
these matters is supplemental
2 35

latter right meaningful.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Part III of this article concluded that a large number of agency
regulations and agency decisions on individual fee-waiver requests are

at variance with the statute and its legislative history. It also concluded
that the advice given by the Attorney Generars 1975 Memorandum
with regard to fee waivers was incomplete and misleading. 236 Finally,
Part III concluded that several of the rulings of the courts that have

heard fee-waiver cases have been reasonably consistent with the legislative history, although all have been made largely in a vacuum, without consideration of the history and legislative intent behind section
552(a)(4)(A). Court decisions on attorneys' fees have done a much better job of developing law on the "public benefit" concept and drawing

on the relevant legislative history.
This section makes recommendations designed to effectuate the

legislative intent with respect to the issues encountered in Part III.
A. Policy-Selting Through Regulations or Case-by-Case Decision-

Making.
Some agency policies are best evolved through the steady accre-

tion of case-by-case decisions, rather than by being spelled out in generic regulations. The adjudicative process allows for experience to be
235. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE
PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7

(1965), reprinted in 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 42. See also S. REP. No. 1219, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1964), reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 98. Congress has, in
another statute involving federal court transcripts, merely provided a right of inspection without
charge, thereby requiring citizens to pay for any desired copies. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(b) (1976)
(transcripts of federal court proceedings are "open during office hours to inspection by any person
without charge") (emphasis added). When Congress further provides in section 552(a)(4)(A) for
copies without charge as well as for search without charge for public-benefit requests, we may
therefore conclude that it meant for the agencies to implement such a program.
236. See text accompanying notes 42-45 supra. The greatest damage to proper implementation of the fee-waiver provision has probably been caused by the general tone of the memorandum, which may have led many agencies into concluding erroneously that they need not have any
fee-waiver policies at all. It bears repeating that an Attorney General's Memorandum "should be
considered not a part of the legislative history," even though it may have been prepared almost
contemporaneously with the enactment of the statute. 1974 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 5, at 9
(commenting on errors in a 1967 Attorney General's Memorandum) (emphasis in original). Unfortunately, the habit of the Department of Justice in handing down FOIA policy pronourkcements, ,pse dixit, without any basis in statutory analysis or legislative history, continued in OILP's
1980 MEMORANDUM, supra note 59. This new memorandum contained 22 pages of policy direction that never cited a committee report, hearing record, or judicial opinion. These sources of law
were discussed only in three pages in an appendix.
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gained and produces enough individual cases so that an agency can
identify the important issues. 237 The decision in National Consumers
Congress,238 upholding an agency regulation amounting "to little more
than a paraphrase of the statutory 'public interest' standard, ' 239 rested
on the notion that in the early days of the FOIA fee-waiver provision,
when agencies lacked experience in applying the statute, case-by-case
decision-making was an appropriate means to evolve policy. The agencies have now had the experience of handling thousands of fee-waiver
requests and deciding hundreds of fee-waiver appeals. The substantive
issues are clear. Therefore, there are no longer good reasons for delaying the articulation of fee-waiver policies in agency regulations. Indeed, even some agencies that are subdivisions of large departments
feel the frustration of lack of guidance in departmental regulations.
The Social Security Administration stated, in response to the Justice
Department's 1979 survey, that the regulations of its parent department
"simply repeat the statutory language, providing no guidance or interpretation of statutory intent. We believe that the regulations should be
amplified so as to provide the guidelines needed to establish the criteria
240
needed to reduce or waive fees."

The Department of Justice could encourage the development of
more adequate regulations by taking the position that an agency cannot
validly deny fee waivers for requests filed by persons associated with
the fields that were apparently within the penumbra of Congress's concern (requests by journalists, for example) unless the agency has
promulgated a regulation limiting its grant of waivers for such persons.
If such leadership by the Department of Justice is lacking, agency offi237. Agency policies toward the regulation of potentially cancer-producing chemicals were

arguably in this category in the early 1970s when the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration engaged in adjudicatory proceedings to regulate
pesticides and occupational chemicals suspected of being carcinogenic. As the issues became
clearer, both agencies moved toward generic "cancer policies" and regulations stating the presumption that a chemical found to produce tumors in laboratory animals posed a risk of cancer to
humans. Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
with 40 C.F.R. § 162.1 l(a)(3)(ii) (1980); compare Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson,
499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) with 29 C.F.R. § 1990.143(b) (1980). Seealso Delaney Amendment
to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(a) (1976).
238. No. 75-1209 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 1976). See text accompanying notes 81-88 supra.
239. No. 75-1209, slip op. at 10.
240. Response on file with the author. Similarly, two-thirds of the agencies responding to a
1977 survey favored uniform, government-wide criteria for fee waivers, though not all favored
binding criteria. 1980 SENATE SUBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 85. It is surprising that so
many agencies recognize the desirability of having more detailed criteria, yet so few agencies have
developed such guidance in their regulations. It is unknown whether this is because of uncertainty
about their authority to do so or because of a lack of time to take on an additional task in a busy
office.
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cials themselves can insist that their regulations be made more specific.
In the final analysis, the courts have the power to force the agencies to
spell out their policies in regulations. This is essentially what the
24 1
Supreme Court did in Morton v. RuiZ.

Even if agencies promulgate regulations that spell out normal
agency policy toward various types of requests, there will be a need to
apply the policy to specific cases and to interpret it in borderline situations. The most important reform needed in the deciding of individual
cases is a requirement that agencies give adequate explanations of their
reasons for reaching particular decisions.2 42 Armed with an explanation, the unsuccessful requester may abandon the attempt to obtain
documents, offer to the agency additional evidence of his purpose, or
litigate on the basis of the request and the explanation of denial. Without such explanations, the likelihood of arbitrary and inconsistent decisions increases.
If an agency does a thorough job of spelling out entitlements or
presumptions in regulations, the need for making available an indexed
file of its decisions is probably not preeminent, for the decisions would
no longer be the primary source of agency policy. Keeping the appeallevel decisions in an indexed file, however, would undoubtedly be useful both to requesters and to the agency personnel deciding cases. If an
agency does not establish clear policy in regulations, it must be assumed that its fee-waiver policy is the cumulative product of its decisions on individual requests-that is, its precedents. As such, all
decisions must be kept in an accessible file, indexed so that the agency
and potential requesters can discern the agency's policies. Permitting
agencies to abstain from both categorical regulations and indexing of
individual decisions is either an endorsement of the disfavored notion
of having "secret law" or a rejection of the position that agencies
should have policies on fee waivers.
B. Substantive Issues.
1. Requests Entitledto Waiver Under the Public-BenetTest. Agencies must use their regulations to amplify the public-benefit test by setting forth the various categories of requests that will normally be
entitled to or ineligible for fee waivers.
The purpose and legislative history of the Freedom of Information
Act point to two groups of requesters whose fees should generally be
241. See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
242. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
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waived. 243 The first group consists of journalists, scholars, and authors.
These persons confer a public benefit by disseminating information to
others, thereby multiplying the benefit obtained from a single release of
documents.
The second group of requesters generally entitled to fee waivers is
persons making requests for nonprofit purposes. Granting fee waivers
to requests made for nonprofit purposes encourages participation in the
governing process by those without a direct economic motivation to do
so. Circular No. A-25, the Administrative Conference study, the 1972
House Report, and the Department of Transportation regulation,
which Congress relied on in enacting the fee-waiver provision, all identifled requests for nonprofit purposes as deserving of fee waivers. 244
There are strong reasons for also entitling indigents to fee waivers.
The 1974 Senate bill included a provision for mandatory fee waivers by
all agencies for requests by indigents. 245 The Conference Committee
omitted the provision, noting in its report that it did not intend to imply
that agencies should charge fees to indigents, but that the question of
waivers to indigents should be a matter for individual agency determination.246 The purpose of the FOIA, to provide citizens with access to
government records, supports granting fee waivers to indigents because, whereas denying a non-indigent's fee-waiver request merely determines that he will bear the cost of access to agency records, denying
an indigent's fee-waiver request determines that he will have no access
to the agency records at all. A fee waiver for indigents would thus help
advance the FOIA's basic purpose.
2. The Role of Cost. An examination of the fee-waiver provision's legislative history revealed no congressional intent that agencies
be allowed to balance the cost of a document search against the public
benefit provided by the search in deciding whether to waive fees.247 A
243. The Department of Justice is moving in the direction of recognizing these same groups as
proper recipients of fee waivers. The Attorney General's 1981 Memorandum identified "representatives of the news media or public-interest organizations and historical researchers" as categories of requesters who should "ordinarily" receive consideration and recommended that waivers
be granted "generously." ATrORNEY GENERAL'S 1981 MEMORANDUM, supra note 54, at 1-2.
244. See text accompanying notes 130-53 supra. Tax-exempt status should not be the determi-

nate for fee-waiver eligibility. Many small, local groups may not have such status because of the
paperwork involved in obtaining it. In addition, tax-exempt status is denied groups that devote a
substantial portion of their activities to influencing legislation, yet influencing legislation is just as
likely to benefit the public as influencing an agency's regulatory or procurement policies. See note
266 infra.

245. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
246. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
247. See text accompanying notes 199-229 supra.

Vol. 1981:213]

FOlA FEE WAIVERS

balancing approach seems attractive because of the fear that fee-waiver
requesters would otherwise impose high costs and unreasonable demands on agency personnel and resources. Allowing an agency to decide how many documents to give out for free, however, makes
favoritism and arbitrary discrimination possible. For example, an
agency might grant waivers to nonprofit groups that support its positions or to friendly journalists, and deny waivers to those who oppose
its policies. 248 To analyze this dilemma, we must consider both the
probable impact of waiving fees for voluminous requests and the feasibility of imposing constraints on requesters other than the charging of
fees for documents.
A recently completed Department of Justice study concluded that
the cost to the federal government of administering the FOIA is nearly
$48 million per year.249 Fees cover only a small portion of costs, in part
because of the congressional limiting of fees to the "direct costs of...
search and duplication. ' '250 The government collected only $1.5 million in fees in 1978, leaving $46.5 million uncollected. 251 Because requests for fee waivers accompany only one or two percent of FOIA
requests, 252 current costs are largely due to requests by those obtaining
private benefit from the FOIA-businesses, for example. The 1980
Senate Subcommittee Report recommended that "agencies should not
refuse to waive fees for the indigent, the media, scholars and non-profit
groups, in order to recoup their costs due to excessive business use of
the Act, an agency practice which has been alleged by some requesters. '253 If the cost of the FOIA is a critical concern, it is for Congress

to amend the statute to allow for greater recoupment of costs from pri248. See note 22 sufpra.
249. The study, conducted by questionnaire to the agencies in 1979 from the Office of Information Law and Policy (OILP), has not been published. The figures are contained in Office of
Information Law and Policy, Best Estimates of Costs of Administering FOIA During Calendar
Year 1978 (July 17, 1979) (unpublished draft). See also OFFICE OF INFORMATION LAW & POLICY,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, FOIA UPDATE, Winter, 1980, at 1. The figures are estimates, and the
General Accounting Office has in the past noted that the lack of systematic and consistent collection of cost data by agencies, and the fact that some documents would be provided even in the
absence of the FOIA, are variables that "limit the validity" of the cost estimates. See GAO, Data
on Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act Provided by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies
(LCD-78-119) at 2 (June 16, 1978).
250. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A) (1976). See the discussion of Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980), in the text accompanying notes 221-25 supra.
251. Office of Information Law and Policy, Best Estimates of Costs of Administering FOIA
During Calendar Year 1978 (July 17, 1979) (unreleased draft). See note 249 supra.
252. See Appendix I infra.
253.

1980 SENATE SuBcoMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 52 n.63.
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vate-benefit requesters,2 54 not for agencies to deny fee waivers to public-benefit requesters.
Concern about the cost of fee waivers is also directed at the implications of granting a categorical right to fee waivers regardless of
amount for certain types of requests. Because the demand for free
goods is unlimited, the argument goes, charging fees is necessary to
discourage requesters from filing unlimited requests. Undoubtedly,
some persons would ask for more documents than they need or could
use if no costs were associated with such requests. Other persons, however, would obtain fewer documents than they need if large-volume
FOIA requests could not receive fee waivers. If these persons would
have used the documents to benefit the general public, the public would
consequently lose these benefits, such as the benefits of thorough historical research.
To provide needed documents in public-benefit requests, while
preventing such requests from imposing unlimited costs on the agencies, a compromise is needed. A system of partial entitlement and partial presumption of entitlement would be a workable compromise.
Fees for journalists, scholars, nonprofit groups, and indigents would
automatically be waived up to a particular amount. This amount
would be higher than the fee threshold set for cases in which the cost of
collecting a fee exceeds the fee.2 55 Above this higher public-benefit
threshold, the requester would be presumed to be entitled to a waiver,
but the agency could rebut this presumption by showing that the request was not benefiting the public because it was frivolous or for pri2 56
vate purposes.
3. Reduction versus Waiver. A final problem is the reduction of
fees. The concept of a partial reduction, rather than a complete waiver,
appears to be an artifact remaining from the time when fee waivers
were permissive under the IOAA rather than mandatory under the
post-1974 FOIA.2 57 The discretion to grant a reduction rather than a
waiver contains a strong potential for abuse, particularly when interpreted to vest "complete" discretion in an agency. This power could
254.
questers
255.
256.

The danger with such a change, however, is that the financial barriers to deserving rewho are wrongfully denied waivers would be even higher than at present.
Fee thresholds are discussed at note 25 supra and accompanying text.
If constraints besides these are needed, one possibility is to impose costs on requesters in

a form other than fees. For example, a public-benefit requester might be required to spend not
money but effort in inspecting documents in a convenient office if the requester asked for excep-

tionally voluminous amounts of material under a broad, vaguely worded request. This alternative
could be abused, however, if applied to large quantities of documents.
257. See note 209 supra and text accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
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undermine whatever fee-waiver policy is adopted. No sound, logical
basis exists to guide an agency in determining the proper amount of a
fee reduction. The Central Intelligence Agency's FOIA officer, discussing with the author the agency's initial policy of reducing fees for some
requests and waiving them for others, and the agency's later tendency
to waive all fees or none, said: "A request is either in the public benefit
or it is not. ' 258 Similarly, the Attorney General's 1981 Memorandum

advised agencies that "in all appropriate cases, complete rather than
partial waivers should be granted. 2 59 The lack of a workable standard
increases the potential for abuse and suggests that fee reductions have
no place in a public-benefit fee-waiver system.
C. Summary of Recommendations.
The recommendations that follow are intended to reflect the preceding discussion. Rather than being broadly-worded statements with
no more specificity than the wording of the public-benefit test itself, the
recommendations are quite specific.
(1) Individual agencies should amend their FOIA regulations to
provide that:
(a) Nonprofit groups, journalists, scholars, authors, other noncommercial researchers, and indigents ("eligible requesters") shall always receive documents free of charge up to 2500 pages and 8 hours
search time. 260 Other requesters shall26receive documents for free up to
250 pages and one hour search time. '
258. Telephone conversation with Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator (Mar. 28,
1980).
259. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S 1981 MEMORANDUM, supra note 54, at 2.
260. This recommendation, like most of the previous discussion of what satisfies the publicbenefit test, is based on who the users of the documents are, rather than on the use to which they
will put the documents (e.g., "journalists" rather than "journalistic purposes"). The Administrative Conference study discussed the possibility of a policy that would base waiver decisions on the
intended use in each case, but concluded that such a policy would probably be unworkable in
actual practice. See text accompanying note 145 supra. Consequently, the study suggested that
fees for search and copying should be based on the identity of the requester. Gianelia, supra note
5, at 259, reprintedin 1974 SOURCE BooK, supra note 5, at 338. Nevertheless, some agencies may
believe that an identity-of-requester approach leaves the door open to abuses. The recommendation could be modified (except as to indigents) to provide that an agency may deny a waiver if it
determines that the requester intends to use the requested documents for wholly private purposes
rather than for the purposes normally signified by the requester's status as a journalist, nonprofit
group, or other eligible requester.
261. The threshold for ordinary (private-benefit) requesters has been set at 250 pages and one
hour of search time because some agencies have recently set similar levels in the belief that below
this point the costs of collecting and processing a payment exceed the amount of the payment.
The recommendation sets the threshold for the specific categories of requesters identified throughout the legislative history at ten times that of ordinary requesters, based in part on such a ratio
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(b) Eligible requesters shall generally receive documents that
they request in excess of 2500 pages and 8 hours search time unless the
agency determines that the requester's purpose is commercial,
financial, or clearly frivolous.
(c) Eligibility shall be considered established without a specific
request for waiver if the agency can determine such status from the
FOIA request filed.
(d) Requesters other than nonprofit groups, journalists, scholars,
authors, other non-commercial researchers, or indigents, whose proposed use of documents in a specific request can be determined pu"marily (not necessarily entirely) to benefit the general public, shall also be
considered "eligible requesters."
(e) Any question of eligibility shall be resolved by telephone if
possible and in the requester's favor when uncertainty remains.
(f) If an agency employee decided to deny a request for a fee
waiver because of the lack of eligibility of a requester, or to deny a
waiver request for documents in excess of 2500 pages because of the
requester's commercial, financial, or clearly frivolous purposes, a written decision shall be issued containing specific reasons for denying the
fee waiver. Each argument a requester raises in writing shall be considered and answered with specificity and not merely by reciting the words
of the statute, the criteria of the 1975 Attorney General's Memorandum, a list of "factors considered," or any other conclusory formulations. The agency shall, in each case of denial, provide the requester
with a copy of the agency's regulations and inform the requester of the
provision for appeal.
(g) The agency shall provide for fee-waiver appeals and keep
copies of appeal decisions available for the reference of agency employees and the public. The decisions shall be indexed for convenient use.
The agency's regulations shall inform the public of the location of these
files and copies of the files shall be provided to any fee-waiver requester free of charge upon demand. 262
(2) Procedural steps may be imposed on voluminous requests
(those portions of requests over 5000 pages) by eligible requesters if the
agency is convinced that the request lacks specificity that the procedural steps can rectify. Requesters may be required to list specific docufound in one agency's policies. See Federal Trade Commission, Staff Bulletin 79-2 (Nov. 21,

1978).
262. One might object that the cost of providing such decisions could be excessive, but this
article has shown that there are few appeal decisions on fee waivers, as a rule. In any case, fee
waivers are also appropriate for such documents. Ifthe cost of providing appeal decisions became
excessive, agencies could at a later time restrict this provision for automatic free copies.
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ments for that portion of a request exceeding 5000 pages, rather than
obtaining a waiver under a request that simply asks for "all documents" in a certain category. The agency shall impose such a requirement only if it makes the category of documents available to the
requester for inspection at a federal office of the requester's choice or
pays transportation expenses for the requester to view the documents
where they are normally located.
(3) Individual agency regulations should not include any of the
following criteria, and should explicitly tell agency employees not to
adopt them, in their decision-making:
(a) A balancing test involving the costs to the agency.
(b) A requirement that inspection of documents substitute for a
waiver of copying fees.
(c) A requirement for detailed written statements from eligible
263
requesters.
(d) A provision for reduction, rather than waiver, of fees for eligible requesters.
(4) The Department of Justice should adopt regulations setting
forth the concepts in recommendations (1), (2), and (3) as guidelines
and should refuse to defend agencies that fail to adopt binding provisions in their own regulations.
(5) The President should consider issuing an executive order requiring all federal departments and agencies to comply with the provision in recommendations (1), (2), and (3).
V.

CONCLUSION

The Freedom of Information Act has never reached its full potential of providing "adequate information to evaluate federal programs
and formulate wise policies" and of preventing government institutions
from becoming "unresponsive to public needs." 264 Under current
agency regulations, search fees and copying charges can "effectively
deny" 265 access to agency documents by the press, scholars and historians, nonprofit public-interest groups, and indigents, though such fees
263. Some agencies, like the General Services Administration, have imposed such requirements. See 46 Fed. Reg. 8513, 8516 (1981) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.305-4). This
seems inconsistent with the FOIA's purpose of making documents readily available to the general
public, not just to those who read the Code of Federal Regulations and who can afford to correspond with the agency for several weeks. If an agency has doubts about a particular requester's
eligibility, it should use the toll-free Federal Telecommunications System telephone line to clear
them up, as proposed in recommendation (1)(e).
264. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
265. 1972 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 57, reprintedin 1975 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 3,
at 64. See note 6 supra and text accompanying notes 208-09 supra.
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have little effect on persons with the financial incentives, motives, or
means to obtain agency documents. The goals of the FOIA are frustrated when persons who want to use the Act primarily to stimulate
research, public debate, political participation, or nonprofit action are
discouraged from obtaining needed information because of fees levied
without adequate controls on individual employee discretion. 26 6 As a
result, the promise of "freedom" of information remains unfulfilled for
many whom the original Act and the 1974 amendments were intended
to help.

266. Public benefit results when information is obtained that helps citizens "in making vital
political choices." Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Blue v. Bureau
of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1978)).
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APPENDIX I
AMOUNT OF FEE WAIVER ACTIVITY
IN SELECTED AGENCIES

Agency
ACTION
Central Intelligence Agency
Commerce/Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric
Admin.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
Defense/Defense Communications Agency
Defense/Defense Logistics Agency
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
Environmental Protection Agency
Export-Import Bank
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
Fed. Reserve Sys.
Fed. Trade Comm'n
Gen. Servs. Admin.
HEW/Social Security Admin.
HEW/Food & Drug Admin.
HEW/Secretary
HUD
Nat'1 Science Foundation
Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n
Office of Management & Budget
Securities & Exchange Comm'n
DOT/Secretary
USDA/Fed. Grain Inspection Serv.
USDA/Food & Nutrition Serv.
USDA/Food Safety & Quality Serv.
USDA/Personnel
USDA/Rural Elec. Admin.
TOTAL

Percentage of FOIA
Requests Involving
Fee-Waiver
Number of Number of
Requests
Fee-Waiver
FOIA
Requests
Requests
88

7

8

1,608

36

2

120

3

3

4,000

3

.1

97

3

3

3,831

69

2

293

8

3

4,223

81

2

64

5

8

82

3

4

4,710

11

1,154

.2
5

1,861

59
124

817

8

32,852

51

492

39

8

12,175

800

7

7
.2

127

1

95

1

644

120

19

30

4

13

135

7

5

1,288

48

4

300
27

13

4

1

4

165

12

7

378

24

6

55

2

274

1
2

71,985

1,544

1
2.1%
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APPENDIX II
AGENCY REGULATIONS GOVERNING FEE-WAIVER
ELIGIBILITY FOR CERTAIN CLASSES
OF REQUESTERS
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

Regulations creating ei'gibility:

Commission on Civil Rights: 45 C.F.R. § 704.1(e)(2)(iii) (1979) (may
waive for federal agency, foreign government, or international governmental
organization); 45 C.F.R. § 704.1(e)(2)(ii) (1979) (may waive for state or local
government agency).
Department of the Army: 32 C.F.R. § 518.19 (1979) (charges may be
waived for state or local government, in the interest of the program).
Department of the Air Force: 32 C.F.R. § 813.1(b)(2) (1979) (may waive
where payment by state or local government "would not be consistent with
traditional policy of Air Force or Federal support of the customer's endeavor").
Department of the Navy: 32 C.F.R. § 701.40(c) (1979) (may waive for
state or local government, in the interest of the program).
Defense Nuclear Agency: 32 C.F.R. § 281.9(e)(1)(ii) (1979) (same as the
Department of the Navy).
Defense Logistics Agency: 32 C.F.R. pt. 1285, app. A, Waiver of fees, .b
(1979) (same).
Federal Communications Commission: 47 C.F.R. § 0.465(c)(3) (1979)
(the FCC has contracted out the right to make copies to a commercial firm but
"has reserved the right to make copies of its records for its own use or for the
use of other agencies of the U.S. Government").
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission: 18 C.F.R. § 3.8(b) (1980) (fees
may be waived for government agencies).
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: 45 C.F.R. § 503.14(d) (1979)
(may waive for "government agency").
Department of the Interior: 43 C.F.R. § 2.19(c)(3)(iv) (1979) (may be
waived for state, local, and foreign governments and public international organizations, when to do so would be an appropriate courtesy or when "to do so
will help to accomplish the work of the Department").
International Boundary and Water Commission: 22 C.F.R. § 1102.4(f)
(1980) (may waive for foreign governments and other agencies).
National Credit Union Administration: 12 C.F.R. § 720.5(e) (1980) (may
waive for a member of Congress or for a federal, state, or local governmental
entity).
Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d) (1980) (will be
waived when to do so is not an undue burden and the request is from a federal, state, or local government organization).
Department of State: 45 Fed. Reg. 58,108, 58,110-11 (1980) (to be codified in 22 C.F.R. § 171.13(e)(2)) (may waive for foreign governments and
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other governmental agencies when it would "promote the objectives of the act
and of the Department").
Regulations creatinga presumption of entitlement:

Department of Agriculture: 7 C.F.R. pt. 1, subpt. A, app. A, § 4b(2)
(1980) (documents shall be furnished without charge to federal agencies if
quantities are "reasonable in number").
Federal Trade Commission: 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(c)(1) (1980) (determination
of waiver will ordinarily not be made unless the requester is a government
agency).
Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 10 C.F.R. § 9.14a(a)(2) (1980) (will be
waived for a federal, state, local, international or foreign agency or government when to do so would be an appropriate courtesy).
Department of Treasury: 31 C.F.R. § 1.6(d)(2) (1980) (will "normally" be
waived for federal, state, or foreign governments, international government
organizations, and local governmental agencies).
Internal Revenue Service: 26 C.F.R. § 601.702(f)(2)(ii)(B) (1980) ("Normally, no charge will be made for providing records to Federal, state or foreign governments, international governmental organizations, or local
government agencies of offices thereof').
Veteran's Administration: 38 C.F.R. § 1.444(d) (1979) (will be waived for
federal, state, and local governments when VA, veterans, beneficiaries, or general public "has a substantial interest in the purpose for which the service is
requested").
Regulations creating entitlement:

Department of Commerce: 15 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(1) (1980) ("fees payable
...do not apply" to federal agencies, federal courts, congressional committees or subcommittees, General Accounting Office, or Library of Congress).
Defense Communications Agency: 32 C.F.R. § 287.5 (1979) ("Exceptions
to charging fees" include state or local government).
Delaware River Basin Commission: 18 C.F.R. § 401.101(a) (1979) ("No
fees shall be charged" where the requester is a congressional committee or
subcommittee, the GAO, an agency of a signatory party, a court, or a state or
local government).
Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(6), (7) (1980)
("No charge shall be made" where the requester is a house of Congress, a
congressional committee or subcommittee ("unless the records are requested
for the benefit of an individual Member of Congress or for a constituent") or a
federal agency).
Food and Drug Administration: 21 C.F.R. § 20.43(a)(2), (3), (4) (1980)
("No fees shall be charged" where the requester is a congressional committee
or subcommittee, the GAO, a federal agency, or a federal court); 21 C.F.R.
§ 20.43(a)(5) (1980) ("No fee shall be charged" where the requester is a foreign, state, or local government or agency, when the waiver is "in the public
interest" and "the objectives of the act and the agency will be promoted").
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National Mediation Board: 29 C.F.R. § 1208.6(b)(1)(ii) (1979) ("No fee
shall be charged" if the requester is a congressional committee or subcommittee, a federal court, a federal agency, or the GAO).
Department of Transportation: 49 C.F.R. § 7.97(b) (1979) ("No fee is
charged" when the requester is a member of Congress requesting information
"for his official use"; is a state, territory, possession, county, or municipal government or agency; is a court when the information will be a substitute for
personal appearance by an officer or employee of the Department; is a foreign
government or agency, or an international organization).
INDIGENTS:

Regulations creating eli'ibility:
Some regulations state that an agency "may waive" fees for indigents:
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission: 45 C.F.R. § 503.14(d) (1979).
National Mediation Board: 29 C.F.R. § 1208.6(b)(2)(i) (1979) ("within
the discretion of the agency").
Postal Service: 39 C.F.R. § 265.8 (1979) (may waive up to $25 when the
fee would be an "undue hardship or inconvenience [to] the requester").
Federal Home Loan Bank Board: 12 C.F.R. § 505.4(e)(5) (1980) (authorized to waive to prevent "unnecessary hardship").
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation: MC 77-3, E(ii) (same as
above).
Interstate Commerce Commission: 49 C.F.R. § 1001.4 (1979) ("undue
hardship").
Other regulations require the request to have a "significant" or "strong"
"public interest justification":
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service: 29 C.F.R. § 1401.36(d)(1)
(1979).
Food and Drug Administration: 21 C.F.R. § 20.43(b) (1980) ("verified
petition").
Department of Labor: 29 C.F.R. § 70.67 (1980).
Other regulations further restrict eligibility by explicitly requiring that the
request not be a burden on agency resources:
Department of Commerce: 15 C.F.R. § 4.9(b)(4) (1980) (fees will not be
charged for an indigent when his request has a strong public-interest justification, and "agency resources permit a waiver"; indigency is a lack of "income
or resources sufficient to pay the fees involved").
Commission on Civil Rights: 45 C.F.R. § 704.1(e)(3)(i) (1979) (fees will
be waived for indigents when a waiver "would not constitute an unreasonable
expense to the Commission"; the Commission requires a "signed statement" of
indigency).
Department of State: 45 Fed. Reg. 58,108, 58,111 (1980) (to be codified in
22 C.F.R. § 171.13(e)(4)).
Department of Treasury: 31 C.F.R. § 1.6(d)(i) (1980) (fees will be waived
for indigents where to do so is not an "unreasonable burden"; the Treasury
requires written demonstration of indigency "under penalty of perjury" and
eligibility for food stamps or similar federal assistance).
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Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d) (1980) (waiver for
"low income person" or "financial hardship" where the request will not impose "undue burden or expenses" on the agency).
Finally, one recently promulgated regulation implies that a requester may
get a waiver if it would "meet the needs of indigent persons or relieve substantial personal hardship":
General Service Administration: 46 Fed. Reg. 8513, 8516 (1981) (to be
codified in 41 C.F.R. § 105-60.305-4(b)).
Regulations creating a presumption of entitlement:
Department of Energy: 10 C.F.R. § 1004.9(a)(1)(iv) (1980) (fees shall be
charged "unless" the FOIA officer "determines" that waiver is in the public
interest; "[s]uch a determination shall ordinarily not be made unless" there
will be primarily public benefit; in making such determination, FOIA officer
"may consider" various factors, including indigency).
Federal Trade Commission: 16 C.F.R. § 4.8(c)(1) (1980) (similar to
above).
Department of Justice: 28 C.F.R. § 16.9(a) (1979) (similar to above).
Regulations creating entitlement:
Legal Services Corporation: 45 C.F.R. § 1602.13(b)-(c) (1979) (will waive
all fees under $25 for an indigent; may waive fee over $25 for an indigent; will
not charge fees under $6.50 for other persons). See text accompanying note 26
supra.
A category for indigency has been in some agency regulations since at
least 1973, when the Department of Justice added a fee-waiver provision to its
regulations on search and copying fees and included the provision for indigents (before passage of the 1974 amendments to the FOIA). Compare 28
C.F.R. § 16.9 (1973) with 28 C.F.R. § 16.4 (1970).
NONPROFIT GROUPS:

Regulations creatingeligibility"
The following major departments, containing several dozen agencies,
have regulations stating that fees "may" be waived "[w]here the recipient is
engaged in a nonprofit activity designed for the public safety, health, or welfare":
Department of Agriculture: 7 C.F.R. pt. 1, subpt. A, app. A, § 4a(3)
(1980).
Department of the Air Force: 32 C.F.R. § 813.1(b)(1) (1978) (must be
"actively promoting the public safety, health, or welfare, and the national interest").
Department of the Army: 32 C.F.R. § 518.19 (1979).
Department of the Navy: 32 C.F.R. § 701.40(c)(1)(i) (1980).
The above provision's lineage can be traced back, through regulations of
the Department of Transportation adopted in 1972, to OMB Circular No. A25 of 1959. 49 C.F.R. § 7.7(c) (1979), 37 Fed. Reg. 6317-18 (1972); OMB Cir-
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cular No. A-25, reprintedin1973 Senate Hearings,supra note 132, at 468-70
app. See the discussion in the text accompanying notes 132-39, 142 supra.
The following state that fees "may" be waived for "nonprofit groups" and
"public interest groups":
Commission on Civil Rights: 45 C.F.R. § 704.1(e)(2)(ii) (1979) ("General
Counsel may in his/her discretion, waive fees" where payment by nonprofit
group "would not be in the general public interest").
Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.FR. § 2.120(d) (1980) (fees may
be waived; waiver "shall be considered (but need not necessarily be granted)
in connection with each request. . from a public interest group").
Department of the Interior: 43 CF.R. § 2.19(c)(3)(iii) (1979) (fees may be
waived for a nonprofit organization "having an official voluntary or cooperative relationship with the Department to assist the .. .organization in its
work with the Department").
Regulations creatingapresumption of entitlement:
Department of Defense: 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in 32 C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iv)) (waiver is "likely to be warranted" for a
"nonprofit public interest group" if the subject is "known to be of wide public
interest" and it "can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public").
Defense Nuclear Agency: 32 CF.R. § 291.9(e)(1)(i) (1979).
Defense Logistics Agency: 32 C.F.R. pt. 1285, app. A, Waiver of fees, L.a
(1979).
Department of Energy: 10 C.F.R. § 1004.9(a)(1)(iii) (1980) (fees will be
charged unless the request is in the public interest; the agency may consider
criteria including the "status of the requester as a representative of a bona fide
public interest group").
Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d) (1980) (fees "will be
waived" when they impose no undue burden on the agency and when the
waiver is for public rather than private benefit, "as will be the case with certain
requests" from nonprofit groups).
Department of Transportation: 49 C.F.R. § 7.97(c) (1979) (waiver "will"
be granted if determined to be in the public interest; "[elxamples of requests
that may fall within this paragraph are reasonable requests from [nonprofit
groups]") (covers several agencies).
Regulations creating entitlement:
Defense Communications Agency: 32 C.F.R. § 287.5 (1979) ("Exceptions
to charging fees are as follows: . ..if the requester is engaged in a nonprofit
activity designed for public health, safety, or welfare. . ."). The same regulation conditions waivers to nonprofit groups on whether the group primarily
benefits the general public-a more discretionary approach. The Forest Service has recently adopted a revision to its manual that grants automatic waivers
up to $50 for any nonprofit group; the Federal Trade Commission hag a similar, but unpublished, policy granting waivers up to $100. See note 26 supra
and accompanying text.
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One other agency takes a completely opposite tact and strongly discourages the granting of waivers on the basis of nonprofit status alone:
Defense Contract Audit Agency: 32 C.F.R. § 290.25(d)(1) (1979) ("[T]he
identity or tax status of the requester. . . is not persuasive grounds for granting a waiver"); 32 C.F.R. § 290.25(d)(2) (1979) ("Fee waivers shall be decided
on case-by-case evaluation. Blanket waivers for specific individuals or organizations will not be granted"). This latter regulation has apparently been superseded by a new department regulation that encourages waivers for
nonprofit groups. 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in 32
C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iv)). It is unknown, however, whether the agency has
implemented the new department regulation and repealed its own regulation.
NEWS MEDIA

Regulations creating eligibility:
Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(d) (1980) (same as
EPA's provision for public-interest groups).
Department of the Interior: 43 C.F.R. § 2.19(c)(3)(i) (1979).
Veterans Administration: 38 C.F.R. § 1.555(f)(1) (1979).
The Internal Revenue Manual 1272, 1 INT. REV. MAN.-ADM. (CCH) ch.
500, 512(2) (1979), singles out the news media as a category for which the
Internal Revenue Service "may" waive fees when to do so is in the "public
interest," although IRS regulations make no special mention of the news media.
Regulations creatinga presumption of entitlement:
Department of Defense: 45 Fed. Reg. 80,502, 80,513 (1980) (to be codified in 32 C.F.R. § 286.60(b)(3)(iii)) (waiver is "likely to be warranted" when
the records are for a "news media requester" if requests are "reasonable in
scope and frequency").
Defense Nuclear Agency: 32 C.F.R. § 291.9(e)(1)(iv) (1979) ("reasonable
number of records," but probably superseded by department regulation).
Defense Logistics Agency: 32 C.F.R. pt. 1285, app. A, Waiver of fees, L.d
(1979) (same as above).
Department of Energy: 10 C.F.R. § 1004.9(a)(1)(ii) (1980) (same as the
department's provision for public-interest groups).
Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d) (1980) (same as the
SBA's provision for nonprofit activities).
The origin of specific fee-waiver provisions for news media was a 1971
recommendation of the Administrative Conference. See text accompanying
note 143 supra.
Regulations creating entitlement:
None.
HISTORIANS, SCHOLARS, AUTHORS, UNIVERSITIES:

Regulations creatingeligibility:
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International Boundary and Water Commission: 22 C.F.R. § 102.4(f)
(1980) ("materials may be furnished without charge ...

to ...

non profit

educational organizations").
Regulations creatinga presumption of entitlement:
Department of Energy: 10 C.F.R. § 1004.9(a)(1)(v) (1980) (same provision for "historian or academician" as the department's provision for publicinterest groups).
Department of Transportation: 49 C.F.R. § 7.97(c) (1979) (examples of
public benefit might be reasonable requests from "schools" and "students engaged in study in the field of transportation").
Most of these categories of requesters would also qualify for fee waivers
under categories previously discussed for nonprofit "activities" or government
agencies (including state universities). No regulation specifically mentions authors, but some authors could qualify under waivers for news media. The idea
of recognizing eligibility for authors can be traced back to the study prepared
for the Administrative Conference in 1971, see text accompanying note 143
supra, whereas the recognition of schools and students first appeared in the
1972 regulations of the Department of Transportation.
Regulations creating entitlement:
None.
OTHERS:

In addition to the five categories listed above, three agencies have special
waiver provisions for employees or former employees to obtain their own per-

sonnel records:
Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(5) (1980).
Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.33(a) (1980).
Department of Transportation: 49 C.]V.R. § 7.97(b)(1) (1979).
One agency has a provision for prospective employers seeking reference
data on former agency employees, or for similar "established business custom":
Department of the Interior: 43 C.F.R. § 2.19(c)(3)(vi) (1979).
One agency has a provision for grantees of the agency or persons performing a contract for the agency:
Environmental Protection Agency: 40 C.F.R. § 2.120(a)(8) (1980).
Two agencies may or will waive fees for persons seeking to obtain
financial benefits to which they are entitled (such as veterans, employees, or
those insured by the government):
Department of the Interior: 43 C.F.R. § 2.19(c)(3)(vii) (1979).
Department of State: 45 Fed. Reg. 58,108, 58,111 (1980) (to be codified in
22 C.F.R. § 171.13(e)(5)).
Finally, one agency has a provision for persons defending themselves in a
proceeding brought by the federal government:
Small Business Administration: 13 C.F.R. § 102.6(d)(4) (1980) (when the
waiver is not an undue burden on agency).
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APPENDIX III
SUMMARY OF FEE THRESHOLD POLICIES
Table 1 lists those agencies that have no free services; Table 2 lists those
agencies that charge fees only when the total search and copying cost reaches a
certain threshold; Table 3 lists agencies with a fee threshold for searching; and
Table 4 lists agencies with a fee threshold for copying. Not all the figures in
Tables 1-4 are based on agency regulations: if an agency stated a higher figure
in correspondence, that figure was used.
TABLE

1

AGENCIES WITH No FREE SERVICES

ACTION
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
Export-Import Bank
Fed. Labor Relations Auth.
Foreign Claims Settlement Comm'n
Interstate Commerce Comm'n
Nat'l Credit Union Admin.
Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
Overseas Private Inv. Corp.
Railroad Retirement Bd.
Dep't of the Treasury
Int'l Communication Agency
Water Resources Council
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TABLE 2
AGENCIES WITH OVERALL FEE THRESHOLDS

Agency
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.

Fed. Reserve Sys.
Dep't of Agriculture
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
Dep't of Justice
Marine Mammal Comm'n
Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin.
Postal Serv.
Nat'l Mediation Bd.
Office of Personnel Management
Comm'n on Civil Rights
Community Servs. Admin.
Farm Credit Admin.
Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare
Food and Drug Admin.
Small Business Admin.
Social Security Admin.
Central Intelligence Agency
Legal Servs. Corp.

Amount
(dollars)
2

2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6.50

Environmental Protection Agency

10

Fed. Trade Comm'n
Forest Serv.
Law Enforcement Assistance Admin.
Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin.
Nat'l Park Serv.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
Rural Elec. Admin.
Dep't of Transportation
Nat'l Science Foundation
Bureau of Mines
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
Dep't of Energy
Gen. Servs. Admin.
Dep't of the Interior
Dep't of State
Dep't of Defense

10
10
10
10
10
10.
10
10
15
25
25
25
25
25
25
30

Automatic?
Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
Ordinarily
Ordinarily
Yes
Yes
No
No

Ordinarily
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

Ordinarily
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TABLE 3
AGENCIES WITH SEARCH FEE THRESHOLDS

Agency
Farm Credit Admin.
Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv.
Comm'n of Fine Arts
Dep't of Justice
Dep't of Labor
Nat'l Science Foundation
Council on Wage & Price Stabilization
Administrative Conference
Environmental Protection Agency
Fed. Maritime Comm'n
Gen. Servs. Admin.
Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare
U.S. Int'l Trade Conm'n
Securities & Exch. Comm'n
Social Security Admin.
Agency for Int'l Dev.
Fed. Communications Com'n
Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.
Internal Revenue Serv.
Nat'l Security Council
Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd.
Office of Management & Budget
Special Representative for Trade Negotiation
Veterans Admin.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n
Tennessee Valley Auth.
Dep't of Commerce
Postal Serv.
Civil Aeronautics Bd.
Selective Serv. Sys.

Amount

(all are automatic)
1/4 hour
I,
'I
I,
'I
'I
'I

1/2 hour
Ii
'I
'I
I,
I,
'I

1 hour
If
'I
'I
'I
I,
I,
'I

4 hours
It

$10
$25
Unlimited
'I
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TABLE 4
AGENCIES WITH Copy FEE THRESHOLDS

Agency
Council on Wage & Price Stabilization
Nat'l Security Council
Office of Management & Budget
Special Representative for Trade Negotiation
Commodity Futures Trad. Comm'n
Internal Revenue Serv.
Fed. Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Dep't of Commerce
Administrative Conference
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n

Amount
3 pages

Automatic?
Yes
I,
Yes
I,
Yes
Yes
4 pages
Yes
10 pages
It
Yes
250 pages
Yes
Yes
50 cents
$1
No
Yes
$2
Yes
$3

